Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy

Abstract

Post-Cold War military reforms inThis article examines patterns of convergence and divergence in post-Cold War British, French and Germany military reforms and finds that it is possible to identify increasing levels of convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defense policy. However, it uncovers significant divergence in the temporality of reform processes.1 The study argues that these patterns of convergence/divergence cannot be explained through a focus on the mediating role played by 'national strategic cultures' -'culturally-bounded' and 'institutionally-embedded' norms that 'predispose societies in general and political elites to certain patterns of behavior'. 2 through an examination of the role of 'political/norm entrepreneurs' within the core executive or actors within the wider security policy subsystem 3 , in reshaping the three layers of belief systems (peripheral, operational and central beliefs) of which strategic cultures are composed. 4 Nor is an examination of the impact of civil-military relations on the organizational culture of defense ministries and military establishments a sufficient account of policy change.5 'Culture' emerges not so much as a cause of action as a tool, resource and instrument for policy leaders concerned with the domestic political and temporal management of reform.The analysis finds that 'international structure' is the key source of change and convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defense policy. 6 However, neo-realist accounts neglect the impact of domestic political factors in constraining the autonomy of the core executive to respond to systemic power shifts over the short-medium term and cannot adequately account for temporal divergence in military reform amongst states of broadly comparable relative material power capabilities and 'external vulnerability'.7 Hence neoclassical realism, that emphasizes the primacy of 'international structure', but also integrates the intervening role played by 'unit-level variables', such as domestic power relationships and strategic leadership, emerges as the most convincing account of convergence/divergence in military reform. As Zakaria argues: 'Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government. Consequently what matters is state power, not national power. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends'. 9 Taliaferro highlights how states which are confronted with the same threat vary in their ability to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society: unit-level variables -state institutions, ideology and nationalism -affect whether and when states choose innovation, emulation or the continuation of existing military strategies. 10 This article responds to the research agenda outlined by Sten Rynning 11, and Gideon Rose 12 by focusing specifically on the impact of different state structures and domestic material p...

Defence Policy under the Labour Government: Operational Dynamism and Strategic Inertia

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“…This initial emphasis upon changes to policy objectives and military command structures in the SDR, followed by investment in procurement around NEC, reflects the insights of neo‐realism. In the absence of an immediate threat to the territorial integrity of a state, policy‐makers in ‘secondary’ states err on the side of caution, follow the strategy of least risk and cost and commit themselves to significant defence procurement initiatives only when strategic imperatives and their associated ‘best practice’ in capability investment become clear and pressing (Hyde‐Price 2007, 32; Dyson 2008, 742). The risks associated with an early emulation of the RMA were pertinently highlighted by Vice‐Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Equipment Capability (1999–2002) in February 2000: ‘If we use technology ineptly, fail to integrate projects properly within an overall programme, pick the wrong technology, fail to spot the weakness which an opponent could exploit, or simply do nothing, we leave ourselves at a potentially staggering disadvantage’ (Blackham 2000a, 34).…”

“…This article forms part of a broader wave of recent scholarship that attempts to reassert the analytical leverage of realist theory in conceptualising defence and security policy in post-cold war Europe (Rynning 2001–02; Posen 2006; Hyde-Price 2007; Dyson 2008 and 2010) and raises some interesting implications for theories of defence transformation. The article also makes an important empirical contribution by exploring the neglected area of the management of military input to British defence planning at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.…”

Elites in Action: Change and Continuity in Strategic Culture

“…By not providing a more detailed analysis of the relationship between culture and framing, strategic cultural literature risks leaving open the question of whether the rationale driving the elite is somehow rooted in the cultural setting or whether it is determined by factors exogenous to culture. If the latter were the case, this would undermine the explanatory power of cultural theories and, instead, it would confirm theories (such as those steeped in realism) that claim to explain change in strictly non-cultural terms (Desch, 1998, p. 166; see also Dyson, 2008).…”

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“…These entrenched views have been at least partly challenged by President Sarkozy's decision in March 2009 to reintegrate France into NATO's high command and by the emergence of a 'spatial differentiation' between ESDP and NATO missions, whereby Europe operates in sub-Saharan Africa and NATO is active in more geo-strategically important zones. 85 A second divergence lies in the different relative importance that policymaking elites in London and Paris attach to Africa, which, in turn, affects their readiness to collaborate on African policy. For France, Africa plays a crucial role in enhancing its rank in the international pecking order, while for the UK, Africa is much more centrally a development issue.…”