Gérer la politique des autres : les vieux problèmes et les vieilles recettes de Mohamed VI pour animer un champ politique désactivé1

Desrues, Thierry; Kirhlani, Said

doi:10.4000/anneemaghreb.608

Cited by 5 publications

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“…25 Some of the evidence in the case was not made public because of its classified nature. 26 On Wednesday the 20 th of February 2008 the minister of Interior, assisted by the Moroccan police, the "Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale" (DGSN), 25 delivered his press-report concerning the case of A.B. He announced the dismantling of a terrorist network, with A.B.…”

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“…According to the DGSN the network financed its activities by hold-ups, trafficking and contributions from its own members. 26,27 The Interior minister, Chakib Benmoussa, declares on the 21 st of February 2008 that the group targeted foreign tourists, Moroccan Jews, and high Moroccan ministers and officials in 2002 and 2005. He charged that various members of the network had contacts over the years with members of al-Qaida and Lebanese Hezbollah.…”

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The Informal Economy of Intelligence into Terrorism A Moroccan-Belgian Case-Study

Devroe¹,

Ponsaers²

2016

FRCIJ

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The informal economy is often considered an exchange economy. This paper focuses on the question of whether intelligence concerning terrorism is an exchange commodity between different parties. Could this kind of exchange be considered as a form of informal economy? If so, what is the exchange value and the utility value for the parties involved? These arguments are explored through reference to a case study of a Moroccan "terrorist network" and the official reaction to it by Moroccan and Belgian police, justice and intelligence services. This case focuses on the relations between the members of the network itself, but also between different public agencies involved in counter terrorism. We start from the observation that the vagueness between legality and criminality is to a large extent supported by the fact that national regulators use other standards concerning which activities they can and want to consider as legal and/or criminal. Also within official regulatory measures, a grey zone can be observed between the governmental capacity to regulate certain activities, and the willingness (or refusal) to intervene. As such, the paper is concerned with the political economy of regulation, the grey zone between technical competence and political desirability.

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