Geopolitics versus geoeconomics: the case of Russia's geostrategy and its effects on the EU

Abstract

Geopolitics and geoeconomics are often addressed together, with the latter seen as a sub‐variant of the former. This article shows the usefulness of differentiating them at a conceptual level. By juxtaposing traditional geopolitics and geoeconomics, we suggest that they have remarkably different qualities and implications for their targets, on both national and international levels. Importantly, these include the formation of alliances, and whether they are driven by balancing, bandwagoning or underbalancing dynamics. An analysis of Russia's shifting geostrategy towards Europe shows these differences in practice. Russian geoeconomics has long been successful as a ‘wedge strategy’, dividing the EU. As a result, the EU has underbalanced and its Russia policies have been incoherent. The observable tendencies in 2014–15 towards a more coherent European approach can be explained by the changing emphasis in Russia's geostrategy. Russia's turn to geopolitics works as a centripetal force, causing a relative increase in EU unity. Centripetal tendencies due to heightened threat perception can be observed in the economic sanctions, emerging German leadership in EU foreign policy, and discussion on energy union. The analysis calls for more attention to the way strategic choices—geopolitics versus geoeconomics—affect the coherence of threatened states and alliance patterns.

Re‐thinking geoeconomics: Towards a political geography of economic geographies

“…Accordingly, a geopolitical use of power refers to offensive foreign policy acts which are conducted by military means. The operational logic of such power projection is “confrontation,” and it is by nature “covert.” Geoeconomic power projection, in turn, is conducted by “economic means” and its operational logic is “selective accommodation.” Accordingly, geoeconomics “can be used as a wedge strategy, attempting to divide a target country or coalition, and through that to weaken its balancing potential” (Wigell & Vihma, , p. 611). The means, operational logics, and effects of geoeconomic and geopolitical power projection thus differ.…”

The Geoeconomics of Russia’s Greater Eurasia Initiative

“…The second objective, to establish collective bargaining power vis‐à‐vis other powers, provides external actors with the incentive of employing a wedge strategy (Wigell & Vihma, , p. 605). The ability of the EEU to produce a net benefit for nonmembers is necessary in order to obtain support for a Union that is largely designed to institutionalize a competitive advantage for Russia within the union and collective bargaining power.…”

Finland’s Dependence on Russian Energy—Mutually Beneficial Trade Relations or an Energy Security Threat?

“…Although Russia may not behave as a liberal actor as the EU [58], it may still operate through spheres of trade. That is, instead of issuing direct threats, Russia aims to influence via geoeconomic measures [59]. In contemporary Russia, it is therefore not security of supply, but security of export or demand that is constructed around the principle of sustaining and increasing energy export revenues [60].…”