Geopolitics, Turkey’s EU accession course and Cyprus: power balances and ‘Soft Power’ calculations

Abstract

Turkey seems to have injected sufficient 'soft power' calculations in its foreign policy, presumably aiming at attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. Yet military power combined with a sustained economic growth are arguably the main drivers of its newly assertive foreign policy. This analysis explores Turkey's regional ambitions, including its potential leverage on conflict resolution, notably in Cyprus, that may conceivably assume significant geopolitical implications on power balances in the region. It is posited that to be successful, Ankara's new posture necessitates a priori the resolution of several bilateral disputes, ranging from Armenia to the Aegean and troop withdrawal from Cyprus. These steps could be taken irrespective of Ankara's European Union accession process, assuming that the new policy is designed to project a credible image of a rising regional power.

The Dynamics of Social Movements in Unrecognized States—A Comparative Study

“…Indeed, the RoC was promised membership to the Union by 2004 and it appeared highly likely that Turkey's bid for membership would also go through should it be able to help resolve the Cypriot conflict. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots had realized the precarity of depending on external aid for their economic survival; therefore, many labor unions as well as Turkish Cypriot activists also promoted peacebuilding so that Turkish Cypriots could enter the EU alongside the RoC and thus gain increased opportunities for trade and tourism (Guven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez, 2002;Yesilada and Sozen, 2002;Theophylactou, 2012). Concurrently, then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan started advocating for peace alongside much of the Turkish Cypriot civil society, as he saw the economic opportunities inherent in a potential EU membership (Theophylactou, 2012).…”

“…Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots had realized the precarity of depending on external aid for their economic survival; therefore, many labor unions as well as Turkish Cypriot activists also promoted peacebuilding so that Turkish Cypriots could enter the EU alongside the RoC and thus gain increased opportunities for trade and tourism (Guven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez, 2002;Yesilada and Sozen, 2002;Theophylactou, 2012). Concurrently, then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan started advocating for peace alongside much of the Turkish Cypriot civil society, as he saw the economic opportunities inherent in a potential EU membership (Theophylactou, 2012). This was a significant deviation from Turkey's prior position towards the conflict of no resolution without significant autonomy for Turkish Cypriots and some territorial control ceded to Turkey.…”