Genes and psychology in the news

Ratner, Carl

doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2004.05.001

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…Moreover, although variation in Mendelian traits usually relates to single-gene variations, such traits are apparently anything but 'simple.' These aspects have attracted many criticisms as they connect, for instance, to genetic determinism, genetic essentialism, and simplistic G-P mapping (Burian & Kampourakis, 2013;Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011;Kendler, 2005;Jamieson & Radick, 2013;Ratner, 2004; I will return to these problems in Section 3).…”

Section: The Received View Of Quantitative and Qualitative Traitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, eventually, this causal explanation was simplified to the point that a simple G-P map (one gene-one trait) was inferred from Mendelian studies (see, e.g., DiFrisco & Jaeger, 2019;Rheinberger et al, 2015). Simplifications of this sort are especially evident in scientific education and communication, where discourses about the gene 'for' x (where x is any complex trait) are rampant (see Burian & Kampourakis, 2013;Jamieson & Radick, 2013;Kendler, 2005;Ratner, 2004).…”

Section: The Cases Of Dwarfism and Pigmentation In Plant And Animal Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Beyond quantitative and qualitative traits: three telling cases in the life sciences

Serpico

2020

Biol Philos

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This paper challenges the common assumption that some phenotypic traits are quantitative while others are qualitative. The distinction between these two kinds of traits is widely influential in biological and biomedical research as well as in scientific education and communication. This is probably due to both historical and epistemological reasons.However, the quantitative/qualitative distinction involves a variety of simplifications on the genetic causes of phenotypic variability and on the development of complex traits. Here, I examine three cases from the life sciences that show inconsistencies in the distinction: Mendelian traits (dwarfism and pigmentation in plant and animal models), Mendelian diseases (phenylketonuria), and polygenic mental disorders (schizophrenia). I show that these traits can be framed both quantitatively and qualitatively depending, for instance, on the methods through which they are investigated and on specific epistemic purposes (e.g., clinical diagnosis versus causal explanation). This suggests that the received view of quantitative and qualitative traits has a limited heuristic power-limited to some local contexts or to the specific methodologies adopted. Throughout the paper, I provide directions for framing phenotypes beyond the quantitative/qualitative distinction. I conclude by pointing at the necessity of developing a principled characterisation of what phenotypic traits, in general, are.

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Section: The Received View Of Quantitative and Qualitative Traitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Cases Of Dwarfism and Pigmentation In Plant And Animal Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond quantitative and qualitative traits: three telling cases in the life sciences

Serpico

2020

Biol Philos

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“…. Even if a gene is a ''necessary component'' of a trait, it does not necessarily mean that the gene causes the trait (Ratner, 2004). .…”

Section: The Fruitless Search For Genesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genetic Research in Psychiatry and Psychology

Joseph¹

2010

Handbook of Developmental Science, Behavior, and Genetics

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IntroductionThe current consensus position in psychiatry and psychology is that, in addition to environmental factors, genes play an important role in causing psychiatric disorders and variation in ''continuously distributed'' psychological traits (such as personality and IQ). The fields of psychiatric genetics and behavior genetics have produced much of the research supporting this position, which consists of two broad areas of investigation. The first explores how a trait is distributed among various types of biologically related (and sometimes unrelated) people. The most common approaches have been the studies of families, of twins, and of people who have been adopted. These methods are sometimes grouped together under the heading kinship research. The second area is molecular genetic research, which attempts to pin down the actual genes that researchers believe underlie various traits and disorders.Contrary to most academic and popular accounts of this research, in this chapter we will see that studies of families, twins, and adoptees are greatly flawed on several critical dimensions. Moreover, countless sensationalized media reports notwithstanding, researchers have failed to discover the genes they believe underlie DSM-defined psychiatric disorders, and normal variation in psychological traits. Due to space considerations, we will look only at the most frequently cited research methods.If a trait is caused or influenced by hereditary factors, we would expect to find a greater concentration of it among members of the same family, roughly proportional to their degree of genetic relatedness. For example, first-degree biological relatives (such as the siblings, children, or parents of an individual) should manifest the trait more often, or resemble each other to a greater degree, than second-degree

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ADHD and Genetics: A Consensus Reconsidered

Joseph¹

2009

Rethinking ADHD

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Genes and psychology in the news

Cited by 6 publications

References 30 publications

Beyond quantitative and qualitative traits: three telling cases in the life sciences

Beyond quantitative and qualitative traits: three telling cases in the life sciences

Genetic Research in Psychiatry and Psychology

ADHD and Genetics: A Consensus Reconsidered

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