Generic one, arbitrary PRO, and the first person

Abstract

The generic pronoun one (or its empty counterpart, arbitrary PRO) exhibits a range of properties that show a special connection to the first person, or rather the relevant intentional agent (speaker, addressee, or described agent). Generic one typically leads to generic sentences whose generalization is obtained from a first-person experience or action or else is meant to be immediately applicable to the relevant agent himself (in particular the addressee). I will argue that generic one involves generic quantification in which the predicate is applied to a given entity 'as if' to the relevant agent himself. This is best understood in terms of simulation, a central notion in some recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (Simulation Theory): Generic one involves 'generic simulation', roughly 'putting oneself into the shoes of anyone meeting relevant conditions'. Formally, this means that generic one introduces a complex variable, consisting of an ordinary variable and a 'mode of presentation' of the relevant intentional agent, namely the property of being identical to that agent. Generic one, like other pronouns acting as bound variables, may also introduce just an ordinary variable. In both cases, the ordinary variable needs to be bound by a sentential generic operator.

Syntax of Generic Null Objects Revisited

“…That's why GNO are especially common in headlines and advertisements which aim to (1) give an impression of a statement verified by its author, and (2) to appeal (and apply) to the reader/listener. The same sort of involvement of the semantic speaker and addressee is attested for English generic one and arbitrary PRO; Moltmann (2006Moltmann ( , 2010 analyzes the special relation of one and PRO arb to the first person in the philosophical sense within the Simulation Theory as "generalizing detached self-reference", roughly corresponding to "putting oneself into the shoes of anyone meeting relevant conditions".…”

Generic uses of the second person singular – how speakers deal with referential ambiguity and misunderstandings

“…The reference of generic pronouns is usually considered to be roughly equivalent to 'people', 'everyone', 'anyone' (Egerland 2003), 'someone', or 'the typical person' (Moltmann 2006 The sentences above are statements concerning people in general, which almost have the status of a universal law: worldwide, there are only few exceptions to the rule in (35a), and as far as I know, having a nose even is a strict condition for people to be able to smell.…”

“…Dahl (2000) takes Swedish man as an egophoric expression, that is, an expression that typically refers to the speech act participants. Moltmann (2006) argues that British one is a particularly speaker-oriented pronoun, as generalisations with one are usually based on a first person experience. However, Malamud (2006:118) points out that "[s]ince the speaker must have some grounds for uttering generalizations, the generalizations with one are often taken to be made on the basis of the speaker's own experience" and argues that this is rather a pragmatically-driven tendency than a grammatical requirement.…”

Expletive agreement, evidentiality, and modality in Logooli

“…We propose that the classification of P as "privileged" or "general" knowledge depends on the group of individuals that the speaker "associates" themselves with, or speaks on behalf of (cf. Moltmann (2006Moltmann ( , 2012). That is, when a speaker reports that P is widely known, they are expressing that P is widely known among the group of individuals that they speak on behalf of.…”