Generalised residuals

Gouriéroux, Christian; Monfort, Alain; Renault, Éric; Trognon, Alain

doi:10.1016/0304-4076(87)90065-0

Cited by 306 publications

(193 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…They have been calculated as the correlations between the residuals of the contract regressions, the monetary incentive Tobits, and the profitability panel. Since the estimation of the monetary incentive equations relies on non-linear MLE methods, we use the generalized residuals proposed by Bourieroux, Monfort, Renault and Trognon (1987).…”

Section: Complementarities and Substitutabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution

Arruñada¹,

Garicano²,

Vázquez³

2001

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

153

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We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights and incentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufacturer opportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.JEL codes: L14, L22, L81, K12 * We thank Oliver Williamson for his advice and support and

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Section: Complementarities and Substitutabilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution

Arruñada¹,

Garicano²,

Vázquez³

2001

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

153

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“…In addition, we also calculate the generalised residuals (Gourieroux et al, 1987) and the deviance residuals for the probit link, and the standardised Pearson residuals for the logit.…”

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confidence: 99%

Does the Extension of Primary Care Practice Opening Hours Reduce the Use of Emergency Services?

2014

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Over-crowding in Emergency Departments (EDs) generates potential inefficiencies. Using regional administrative data, we investigate the impact of an increase in the accessibility of primary care on ED visits in Italy. We test whether extending practice opening hours up to 12 hours/day reduces inappropriate ED visits. We estimate count data models, considering different measures for ED visits recorded at the list level.Since the extension programme is voluntary, we also account for the potential endogeneity of participation, using a two-stage residual inclusion and a GMM approach. Our results show that improving primary care accessibility favours a more appropriate use of EDs.

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“…Ultimately, the threshold does not matter, as the results are significant at the 1 per cent level with any reasonable threshold. 44 Gourie´roux et al (1987). (4), (7) a binary variable equal to one if the home meets a "superior construction" designation, (8) binary variables related to the proximity of fire stations (6), and (9) a binary variable equal to one if the home is in the coastal region.…”

Section: Methodology and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Examination of Adverse Selection in the Public Provision of Insurance

Dumm

Eckles

Halek

2013

Geneva Risk Insur Rev

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Using a unique data set from Florida's residual property insurer, we test for adverse selection in the public provision of homeowners' insurance in Florida. We find a significant relationship between the losses and deductible choices of insureds in Florida's residual homeowners' insurance market. This relationship provides strong evidence of the existence of an adverse selection problem in Florida's residual property insurance market. While this relationship is important to Florida regulators (and taxpayers) specifically, a finding of an adverse selection problem in residual markets in general has implications more broadly for government providers of insurance as an adverse selection problem in these settings will impact the public policy debates and decisions involving these markets.

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Generalised residuals

Cited by 306 publications

References 9 publications

Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution

Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile Distribution

Does the Extension of Primary Care Practice Opening Hours Reduce the Use of Emergency Services?

An Examination of Adverse Selection in the Public Provision of Insurance

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