General Equilibrium Modelling of Industries with Production Externalities

Abstract

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Linear Pigovian taxes and the optimal size of a polluting industry

“…The model is of a firm-on-consumer externality. Some of the earlier literature~e.g., Kohn 1985Kohn , 1994Mestelman 1986! looked at models of firm-on-firm~production!…”