When Subsidies for Pollution Abatement Increase Total Emissions

Kohn, Robert E.

doi:10.2307/1060386

Cited by 22 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…However, if the subsidy is available to entering producers, then in the long run, subsidies can produce very different outcome than taxes, and can even be counterproductive in terms of reducing emissions (see, e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988;Pearce and Turner, 1990;Kohn, 1992). Because subsidies lower average costs, farms earn above-normal profits, which creates an incentive for additional farms to enter production.…”

Section: Gerber Key Portet and Steinfeldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy options in addressing livestock’s contribution to climate change

Gerber

Key

Portet

et al. 2010

Animal

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There is a great potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions related to livestock production. For achieving this potential will require new initiatives at national and international levels that include promoting research and development on new mitigation technologies; deploying, diffusing and transferring technologies to mitigate emissions; and enhancing capacities to monitor, report and verify emissions from livestock production. This study describes the sources of livestock-related GHG emissions and reviews available mitigation technologies and practices. We assess the main policy instruments available to curb emissions and promote carbon sinks, and discuss the relative merits of alternative approaches. We discuss recent experiences in countries that have enacted mitigation strategies for the livestock sector to illustrate some of the key issues and constraints in policy implementation. Finally, we explore the main issues and challenges surrounding international efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and discuss some possible ways to address these challenges in future climate agreements.

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Section: Gerber Key Portet and Steinfeldmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy options in addressing livestock’s contribution to climate change

Gerber

Key

Portet

et al. 2010

Animal

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show abstract

“…This policy is common in many countries and settings. Theoretical research has lamented the poor incentives of such subsidies (Kohn 1992;Aidt 1998;Fredriksson 1998) and empirical research is scarce. 3 Our analysis of heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost ratios also provides a new domain to consider recent research on spatially differentiated policy (Muller and Mendelsohn 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality

Keiser¹,

Shapiro²

2018

SSRN Journal

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Since the 1972 U.S. Clean Water Act, government and industry have invested over $1 trillion to abate water pollution, or $100 per person-year. Over half of U.S. stream and river miles, however, still violate pollution standards. We use the most comprehensive set of files ever compiled on water pollution and its determinants, including 50 million pollution readings from 170,000 monitoring sites, to study water pollution's trends, causes, and welfare consequences. We have three main findings. First, water pollution concentrations have fallen substantially since 1972, though were declining at faster rates before then. Second, the Clean Water Act's grants to municipal wastewater treatment plants caused some of these declines. Third, the grants' estimated effects on housing values are generally smaller than the grants' costs.

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“…In the context of a 2-good, 2-factor general equilibrium model in which only one of the production processes generates pollution, Mestelman (1981Mestelman ( , 1982 constructs examples in which fiscal incentives for pollution abatement can have perverse implications because of the patterns of substitution which they induce. Kohn (1992) extends these analyses and presents further numerical examples whilst Plott (1%6), in a similar framework, shows the welfare-reducing implications of taxing the 'wrong' input when a good is jointly produced by way of a polluting and non-polluting factor of production.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 79%

Discharge Taxes When Regulatory Jurisdiction Is Incomplete: A Simpleapplication of the Theory of the Second Best

Heyes

1994

Scottish J Political Eco

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When Subsidies for Pollution Abatement Increase Total Emissions

Cited by 22 publications

References 23 publications

Policy options in addressing livestock’s contribution to climate change

Policy options in addressing livestock’s contribution to climate change

Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality

Discharge Taxes When Regulatory Jurisdiction Is Incomplete: A Simpleapplication of the Theory of the Second Best

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