Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution

Abstract

Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribution under democracyex ante. Using global panel data (1972–2008), this study finds that there is a relationship between democracy and redistribution only if elites are politically weak during a transition; for example, when there is revolutionary pressure. Redistribution is also greater if a democratic regime can avoid adopting and operating under a constitution written by outgoing elites and instead create a new constitution that redefines the political game. This finding holds across three different measures of redistribution and instrumental variables estimation. This article also documents the ways in which elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.

The Non-Democratic Roots of Elite Capture: Evidence From Soeharto Mayors in Indonesia

“…PDI-P, the main opposition party, obtained the 4 To the best of our knowledge, there are only two other papers that have empirically documented the impact of nondemocratic legacies on governance outcomes. Albertus and Menaldo (2014) showed that income redistribution is lower in democracies that are preceded by democratic transitions where nondemocratic elites remained powerful-for example, in transitions where the new democracy adopted the constitution of the previous regime. Martinez-Bravo (2014) showed that the village-level appointees that a new democracy inherits from the previous regime have strong incentives to engage in electoral malpractice for strategic reasons.…”

Local Neocolonialism and Terrorism in Africa

“…Similar to the common identification of autocratic systems with inequality, Albertus and Menaldo (2014) found that economic elites impede the redistribution of resources, even during democratic regimes. Using a global, panel data set, spanning the years 1972-2008, they found that democratic regimes are better able to avoid the trap of elite dominance by crafting a new constitution protected from the prejudices of the outgoing regime.…”

Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats

“…Constitutions under democracy that are inherited from dictatorship shape the rules of the political game in such a way that rightwing parties are likely to be more represented, the political system is more prone to gridlock, the military is more powerful, and local governments lack autonomy. The veracity of these mechanisms in protecting outgoing dictators from punishment echoes the findings in Albertus and Menaldo (2013), who demonstrate their broader impact for the economic interests of elites beyond simply avoiding punishment.…”