IN THIS SUBSECTION, we present a theoretical model that formalizes the mechanism that, we argue, is behind our empirical results. This model is an adaptation of the one presented in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). We implement a number of modifications to their setting to adapt it to the Indonesian context. Furthermore, we impose a number of assumptions that make the exposition easier and help us focus on the main result of interest. We refer the interested reader to Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) for a thorough description of the interactions between the agents of the model and for additional insights and results.Consider a society made up of an elite and citizens. The country is divided into equallysized districts, each with a population of M elites. The elite and citizens regularly contest power in each district. The group that wins power makes decisions over economic institutions. We denote by s t ∈ {E C} the group that is in power in period t, with E referring to the elite and C referring to citizens. When the elite is in power, they choose their most beneficial set of economic institutions obtaining payoff R e . When the citizens are in power, the set of economic institutions that citizens choose leads to a payoff of R c for the elite. We define R = R e − R c > 0 as the difference between these two payoffs.The game starts as a dictatorship and the elite is in power in all districts. However, for reasons exogenous to the local power dynamics, the country becomes democratic. Local-level elections are scheduled in all districts. We assume that the group that wins the election remains in power forever, and as a result, the subsequent regime becomes an absorbing state.
1The electoral equilibrium is determined by the relative level of political power of both groups. Political power is defined by the interaction of de jure political power and de facto political power. Since citizens are the most numerous group, democratization grants citizens with a baseline amount of de jure political power equal to p > 0. The overall level of political power that citizens have at the time of the local election isMonica Martinez-Bravo: mmb@cemfi.es Priya Mukherjee: pmukherjee@wm.edu Andreas Stegmann: stegmann@cemfi.edu.es 1 Our static framework is in sharp contrast to the model in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) which is fully dynamic. The result we focus on is also present in a dynamic version of the model.
This paper reviews the research on fortification of food in the context of South Asia, with an emphasis on avenues for future research in economics and policy. We argue that while the efficacy of fortified foods in controlled settings is well established, more research is needed to evaluate the take-up and effectiveness of fortified foods distributed through standard channels. In addition, we argue that more research is needed to understand the determinants of long-term demand for fortified foods. JEL codes: I15, I18.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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