Game‐theoretic Insights Into the International Management of Fisheries

McKelvey, Robert

doi:10.1111/j.1939-7445.1997.tb00104.x

Cited by 40 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…A repeated game setting for fishery management is used e.g. by Hannesson (1995) and for game-theoretic insights into the management of transboundary fisheries, see McKelvey (1997). Mesterton-Gibbons (1993) provides a survey of game-theoretic modeling in resource economics.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectation-Stock Dynamics in Multi-Agent Fisheries

Bischi

Kopel²,

Szidarovszky

2005

Ann Oper Res

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In this paper we consider a game-theoretic dynamic model describing the exploitation of a renewable resource. Our model is based on a Cournot oligopoly game where n profit-maximizing players harvest fish and sell their catch on m markets. We assume that the players do not know the law governing the reproduction of the resource. Instead they use an adaptive updating scheme to forecast the future fish stock. We analyze the resulting dynamical system which describes how the fish population and the forecasts (expectations) of the players evolve over time. We provide results on the existence and local stability of steady states. We consider the set of initial conditions which give non-negative trajectories converging to an equilibrium and illustrate how this set can be characterized. We show how such sets may change as some structural parameters of our model are varied and how these changes can be explained. This paper extends existing results in the literature by showing that they also hold in our two-dimensional framework. Moreover, by using analytical and numerical methods, we provide some new results on global dynamics which show that such sets of initial conditions can have complicated topological structures, a situation which may be particularly troublesome for policymakers.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Expectation-Stock Dynamics in Multi-Agent Fisheries

Bischi

Kopel²,

Szidarovszky

2005

Ann Oper Res

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“…Note that the predictions from the shared fishery model, where each fishery controls a portion of the stock, are more optimistic than those from the sequential fishery models by Hannesson (1995), McKelvey (1997. Instead of harvesting down to the zero marginal profit level, c/p, the fleet managers now partially account for the expected effect of their harvest on the stock available in the following year.…”

Section: Implications Of Non-cooperative Harvestingmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Hannesson (1995) examines the cooperative management of a sequentially harvested fish stock as a non-cooperative game. McKelvey (1997) studies the sequential fishery under asymmetric information on the participants' profits.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in a Stochastic Transboundary Fishery: The Effects of Implementation Uncertainty Versus Recruitment Uncertainty

Laukkanen

2005

Environ Resource Econ

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This paper examines how non-binding cooperative agreements on fisheries management can be sustained when the management plans in participating countries are implemented imperfectly, and compares the effects of implementation uncertainty and of recruitment uncertainty on the potential for cooperation. The model developed assumes two countries that share a fish stock. Reproduction depends on how much fish each country leaves behind after harvesting and hence on random variation in each country’s achieved abandonment level. A self-enforcing agreement is proposed that accounts for the random variation. The agreement is illustrated with a numerical example. A self-enforcing cooperative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not pronounced and when the two countries control close to equal shares of the fishery. Even when a cooperative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-cooperative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. A comparison of the effects of recruitment and implementation uncertainty on implicit cooperation indicates that implementation uncertainty is more likely to hamper cooperation. Copyright Springer 2005fisheries management, implementation uncertainty, non-cooperative games, transboundary fisheries, Q22, C72,

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“…Hannesson (1997) examines how critical the number of agents sharing a fish stock is for realizing the cooperative solution. Hannesson (1995) and McKelvey (1997) address the management of a sequentially harvested fish stock. Hannesson examines cooperative management as a self-enforcing equilibrium in a non-cooperative game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With the exception of McKelvey (1997), the game theoretic literature reviewed above neglects uncertainty. Yet fisheries are plagued by uncertainty regarding biological processes as well as implementation of management objectives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transboundary Fisheries Management Under Implementation Uncertainty

Laukkanen

2003

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Terms of use: Documents in Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty SummaryThis paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary cooperation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing cooperative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-cooperative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.

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Game‐theoretic Insights Into the International Management of Fisheries

Cited by 40 publications

References 15 publications

Expectation-Stock Dynamics in Multi-Agent Fisheries

Expectation-Stock Dynamics in Multi-Agent Fisheries

Cooperation in a Stochastic Transboundary Fishery: The Effects of Implementation Uncertainty Versus Recruitment Uncertainty

Transboundary Fisheries Management Under Implementation Uncertainty

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