Game-theoretic approach to simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains with one manufacturing firm and multiple cooperative suppliers

Zhang, Xin Yan; Huang, George Q.

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.10.016

Cited by 51 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…3. Many focused on the use of other kinds of coordinating contracts such as buyback, rebate, cost sharing, profit sharing discount models, option contracts and benefit sharing in multi-echelon SC problems (Cachon, Lariviere 2005;Yali, Zhanguo 2010;Chen, Zhang 2008;Cao et al 2007;Cachon, Lariviere 1999;Zhang, Huang 2010;Cachon, Lariviere 2001;Leng, Parlar 2009;Xiao, Qi 2008;Chen, Xiao 2009;Xiao et al 2007;Stein, Ginevicius 2010a;Stein 2010). 4.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership Selection in an Unlimited Three-Echelon Supply Chain

Jia

Mahdiraji

Govindan

et al. 2013

Journal of Business Economics and Management

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Abstract. Supply chain (SC) management aims to increase the overall profit through improvement of various activities and components. Many contradictions between parts and different levels of a SC have been identified in order to achieve overall objectives. Such shortfalls may result in decreased strength and competitiveness of the SC. This paper considers the main conflicts related to inventory, pricing and marketing costs in an unlimited three-echelon supply chain. Aimed at avoiding a profit decrease, the research focuses on finding an equilibrium between inventory, pricing and marketing cost of an unlimited three-echelon SC. On each level, the best leadership option with the greatest payoff is sought for between K retailer, M manufacturer and S supplier. According to Stackelberg non-cooperative game theory, each SC level can become a decision-making leader depending on the available negotiating power. Consequently, three leadership types are modelled on each level and the total SC profit is calculated and compared to ascertain the best option. The authors of the article found that transfer of leadership from a retailer to supplier results in reduction of the total profit. In addition, the research focused on the main effects of parameters used in leadership models. Finally, validation of the proposed model was examined by simulation and Arena software, which indicated that models based on a game theory were performed accurately.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leadership Selection in an Unlimited Three-Echelon Supply Chain

Jia

Mahdiraji

Govindan

et al. 2013

Journal of Business Economics and Management

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“…Literature has put more attention on relationships among partners in customer oriented environments where a more flexible and efficient supply chain is requested. The relationship is interpreted as integration and cooperation between suppliermanufacturer, manufacturer-customer; and among internal divisions of manufacturer [15], [22], [25], [34], [45,46]. Literature rarely differentiates cooperation and integration and draws the line between them.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some studies, like Pan and Holland [4], defines cooperation as a beneficial relationship between actors namely customer, manufacturer and other partners such as supplier and distributers. It is believed that this relationship aims to improve outcomes like customer satisfaction, time to market or resource usage by setting common objectives and reducing duplicated activities for increasing value added activities [46]. Integration is a more rigorous concept which aims to integrate the actors in both ends (downstream and upstream) to achieve an optimal output.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Number of methods/mechanisms/tools employed to gather data from customers Cooperation level with partners Joint profits [46] This factor refers to decisions made jointly to bring out better results in set of aspects such as profit Percentage of partners with joint profit agreement Type of shared information [34] This factor refers to set of information that its sharing can bring advantages to partners. Sharing information such as delivery due date, cost of delay, total time of manufacturing; and distribution with partners, are some examples which beside profit, brings improvements in service level, quality and etc.…”

Section: Relationship Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mass Customization in Supply Chain Level: Development of a Conceptual Framework to Manage and Assess Performance

Zebardast

Malpezi

Taisch

2013

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology

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Abstract. Recent market interest on customized offers and intensive competition on attracting market globally, lead companies to implement supply chain management to improve performance and gain competitive advantage. To this aim, Supply chain management in customer-oriented environment is pursuing the transition from traditional supply chain into concurrent flexible and efficient one. This paper aims to understand specifically how supply chain within this environment needs to be configured and managed in order to enable efficient customization for mass market. To reach this goal, a conceptual framework and list of indicators to support the framework have been developed and tested.

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“…In line with Chinese policy, all electricity generated from biomass has been purchased by the State Grid Corporation of China at a price Pe since 2010 [9]. Pe, including the incentive that the government provides to biomass power plants, is higher than the price of electricity generated from fossil fuels.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain

Wang

Watanabe

2016

Energies

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Abstract:The rapid expansion of the biomass power generation industry has resulted in the conversion of substantial agricultural waste (crop straw) into energy feedstock, thereby increasing the income of farmers and promoting the development of rural areas. However, the promising industry faces financial deficits because of difficulties in collecting straw from farmers. To determine strategies for overcoming the biomass supply problem, we apply Stackelberg game theory in modeling the Chinese biomass supply chain and design incentive scenarios under stakeholder risk perception. We illustrate the proposed methodology through an empirical case study on China and demonstrate the effects of incentives on farmers and middlemen. Results show that with incentives, straw quantity and stakeholder profit are expected to increase. Incentives exert a particularly remarkable effect on farmers, with such inducements producing the highest social welfare. Moreover, perceived risk dramatically affects stakeholder profit. Mitigating the risk perception of farmers is expected to significantly advance the development of the biomass power generation industry, increase stakeholder profit, and decrease the amount of incentives needed.

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Game-theoretic approach to simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains with one manufacturing firm and multiple cooperative suppliers

Cited by 51 publications

References 39 publications

Leadership Selection in an Unlimited Three-Echelon Supply Chain

Leadership Selection in an Unlimited Three-Echelon Supply Chain

Mass Customization in Supply Chain Level: Development of a Conceptual Framework to Manage and Assess Performance

A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain

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