Game Analysis of Wind Storage Joint Ventures Participation in Power Market Based on a Double-Layer Stochastic Optimization Model

Abstract

The volatility of a new energy output leads to bidding bias when participating in the power market competition. A pumped storage power station is an ideal method of stabilizing new energy volatility. Therefore, wind power suppliers and pumped storage power stations first form wind storage joint ventures to participate in power market competition. At the same time, middlemen are introduced, constructing an upper-level game model (considering power producers and wind storage joint ventures) that forms equilibrium results of bidding competition in the wholesale and power distribution markets. Based on the equilibrium result of the upper-level model, a lower model is constructed to distribute the profits from wind storage joint ventures. The profits of each wind storage joint venture, wind power supplier, and pumped storage power station are obtained by the Nash negotiation and the Shapely value method. Finally, a case study is conducted. The results show that the wind storage joint ventures can improve the economics of the system. Further, the middlemen can smooth the rapid fluctuation of power price in the distribution and wholesale market, maintaining a smooth and efficient operation of the electricity market. These findings provide information for the design of an electricity market competition mechanism and the promotion of new energy power generation.

Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

“…(2) Outer game: each power supplier constitutes a competitive non-cooperative game among themselves, and reaches bilateral transactions with large consumers through bidding strategies [18]; each power supplier strives to make its own bidding competitive among the biddings of multiple power suppliers in order to obtain more electricity purchases from large consumers and maximize its profit from the sale of electricity [19]. (2) Outer game: each power supplier constitutes a competitive non-cooperative game among themselves, and reaches bilateral transactions with large consumers through bidding strategies [18]; each power supplier strives to make its own bidding competitive among the biddings of multiple power suppliers in order to obtain more electricity purchases from large consumers and maximize its profit from the sale of electricity [19].…”

Two-Part Tariff Policy and Total Factor Productivity of Pumped Storage Industry: Stimulation or Failure?

“…Zhang et al [24] proposed that the optimization of pumped storage capacity price mechanism could effectively improve the utilization rate of renewable energy. Based on the doublelayer stochastic optimization model and the assumed samples, Ma et al [25] posited a competitive equilibrium pricing mechanism for wind power suppliers, pumped storage plants and intermediate vendors. Given the parameters of the storage system, the case study of Li et al [26] also suggested that adopting a joint pricing mechanism of "wind + pumped storage" would help to improve the efficiency of the storage system.…”

Two-Part Tariff of Pumped Storage Power Plants for Wind Power Accommodation

“…Many studies found that multi-level cooperative planning and control of energy storage systema reduced the investment cost of the system and realized the optimal configuration operation of energy storage equipment [19,20]. Wu et al [21] provided joint participation of multiple wind power and pumped storage power plants in a spot market model, which considered the uncertainty of wind power real-time output, and proposed an optimal bidding strategy before a joint wind storage day. Heussen et al [22] designed operating strategies for up to 100% RES power systems, explicitly considering non-dispatchable generation and storage capacity, as well as the evaluation of operational performance in terms of energy efficiency, reliability, environmental impact, and cost.…”