“Gabba‐Gabba, We Accept You, One of Us”: Vulnerability and Power in the Relationship of Recognition

Ferrarese, Estelle

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675.2009.00564.x

Cited by 14 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In this example, the young client challenges the order of recognition. This shows how individuals may not gratefully and inevitably accept the recognition that is offered to them (see Ferrarese, 2009). Institutions do not force people to act in a certain way.…”

Section: Contradictions Between Individual Needs and Institutional Pomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, we can assume that, from a young person's perspective, being treated equally and neutrally as a client by a social worker can actually highlight the absence of personal emotional care. Therefore, in some cases, youths can even decline recognition (see Decker, 2012, p. 220; Ferrarese, 2009). They can expect recognition beyond the institutional limits in interpersonal play, but social workers have to follow the rules of the game; namely, laws and guidelines (Mead, 1934/2010, pp.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Contradictions between individually needed and institutionally offered forms of recognition

Salminen

2020

Constellations

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Powell, & Fitzgerald, 2016) do not always recognize young people in an all-encompassing manner as emotional, equal, and capable human beings. In this article, I study how institutional and professional roles direct and limit the recognition that can be offered (see Sointu, 2006). For example, the primary obligation of social workers in their institutional role is to respect the rights of clients equally and identically. However, this approach can lead to misrecognition if a young client expects to be treated like a friend, that is, as an emotional and unique individual. To study systematically contradictions in recognition; namely, what is institutionally offered and individually needed, I utilize Honneth's (1995, 2004) three forms of recognition: loving and caring for another person (called love), respecting another person's rights (rights), and valuing the unique skills and features of another person (solidarity). This threefold conceptualization has been widely used in research on the relations between youths and, for example:

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Section: Contradictions Between Individual Needs and Institutional Pomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contradictions between individually needed and institutionally offered forms of recognition

Salminen

2020

Constellations

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“…Honneth and Fraser have inspired scholars in philosophy (Ferrarese 2009;Fowler 2009), political science (Swanson 2005), business management (Islam 2012), public policy (Craig, Burchardt, and Gordon 2008) and sociology (Brandheim 2012;Grover 2013;Hancock 2016;Heinich 2009;Holtgrewe 2001;Houston 2016;Juul 2012;Lister 2001Lister , 2002May 2016;Sointu 2006;Thunman 2012;Voswinkel 2012). However, many of these studies focus on misrecognition, humiliation or disrespect and dedicate few words to its opposite, recognition.…”

Section: Recognition In Sociologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Unfolding recognition: an empirical-theoretical contribution to the concept

Sebrechts

Tonkens

Roit

2019

Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory

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The past decades have witnessed growing interest in the concept of recognition, in social movements as well as in social theory. While the 'recognition turn' has made recognition a cornerstone in social and political philosophy, empirical interestin sociology, anthropology and business studiesremains limited and has mainly focused on misrecognition and disrespect. As a result, recognition as a theoretical ideal remains largely divorced from the lived and messy realities of people's everyday search for recognition. This article addresses this lacuna. Based on long-term participant observation and interviews with professionals and young men with mild intellectual disabilities working in sheltered employment projects in the Netherlands, it examines everyday practices of claiming and receiving recognition, how recognition is shaped by the institutional environment of sheltered work, and how it is achieved or subverted in everyday interactions between young men and professionals. Our contribution to the literature lies in our empirical finding that misrecognition is often enfolded in recognition. By stating that misrecognition is enfolded in recognition, we mean that an instance of recognition coincides with, and likely depends on, some form of misrecognition. While focusing on the messiness and ambivalence of recognition in everyday life may dilute it as an ideal, acknowledging its dark side opens the path to a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic in which misrecognition, rather than being its opposite, is enfolded within recognition.

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“…48 Zurn, 2015: 209. 49 See Allen (2010), Connolly (2010), Ferrarese (2009), McNay (2008, Petherbridge (2013), Rössler (2007), and Young (2007). 50 Steinem (2016).…”

Section: IIImentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic injustice

Giladi

2017

Philosophy & Social Criticism

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My aim in this article is to propose that an insightful way of articulating the feminist concept of epistemic injustice can be provided by paying significant attention to recognition theory. The article intends to provide an account for diagnosing epistemic injustice as a social pathology and also attempts to paint a picture of some social cure of structural forms of epistemic injustice. While there are many virtues to the literature on epistemic injustice, epistemic exclusion and silencing, current discourse on diagnosing as well as explicating and overcoming these social pathologies can be improved and enriched by bringing recognition theory into the conversation: under recognition theory, social normative standards are constructed out of the moral grammar of recognition attributions. I shall argue that the failure to properly recognize and afford somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit is an act of injustice in the sense of depriving individuals of a progressive social environment in which the epistemic respect afforded to them plays a significant role in enabling and fostering their self-confidence as rational enquirers. Testimonial injustice is particularly harrowing, because it robs a group or an individual of the status of a rational enquirer, thereby creating an asymmetrical cognitive environment in which that group or individual is not deemed one’s conversational peer. Hermeneutical injustice is particularly harrowing, because asymmetrical cognitive environments further entrench the normative power of ideology.

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“Gabba‐Gabba, We Accept You, One of Us”: Vulnerability and Power in the Relationship of Recognition

Cited by 14 publications

References 4 publications

Contradictions between individually needed and institutionally offered forms of recognition

Contradictions between individually needed and institutionally offered forms of recognition

Unfolding recognition: an empirical-theoretical contribution to the concept

Epistemic injustice

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