Epistemic injustice

Abstract

My aim in this article is to propose that an insightful way of articulating the feminist concept of epistemic injustice can be provided by paying significant attention to recognition theory. The article intends to provide an account for diagnosing epistemic injustice as a social pathology and also attempts to paint a picture of some social cure of structural forms of epistemic injustice. While there are many virtues to the literature on epistemic injustice, epistemic exclusion and silencing, current discourse on diagnosing as well as explicating and overcoming these social pathologies can be improved and enriched by bringing recognition theory into the conversation: under recognition theory, social normative standards are constructed out of the moral grammar of recognition attributions. I shall argue that the failure to properly recognize and afford somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit is an act of injustice in the sense of depriving individuals of a progressive social environment in which the epistemic respect afforded to them plays a significant role in enabling and fostering their self-confidence as rational enquirers. Testimonial injustice is particularly harrowing, because it robs a group or an individual of the status of a rational enquirer, thereby creating an asymmetrical cognitive environment in which that group or individual is not deemed one’s conversational peer. Hermeneutical injustice is particularly harrowing, because asymmetrical cognitive environments further entrench the normative power of ideology.

“Obstetric Violence,” “Mistreatment,” and “Disrespect and Abuse”: Reflections on the Politics of Naming Violations During Facility-Based Childbirth

“…“Naming involves making visible what was invisible, defining as unacceptable what was acceptable and insisting that what was naturalized is problematic” (Kelly 1993, 139), and in this way naming processes enable us to manipulate the world (Spender 1998, 163). Naming helps to make sense of experiences, develop consciousness-raising initiatives, improve measures for solidarity, and develop practical ways to bring about social change (Giladi 2018). In terms of social change, names inform how an issue is measured, legislated, and resourced (Boyle 2019).…”

Delivering gender justice in academia through gender equality plans? Normative and practical challenges

“…Epistemic injustice is also closely linked to a form of cultural injustice emanating from either misrecognition or nonrecognition, whereby an individual or a social group is not deemed one's conversational peer (Giladi, 2018, 2020). In academic and research contexts, the granting of epistemic authority is an act by which we recognize an individual as competent and trustworthy in relation to the various activities required for the production and transmission of knowledge.…”

Minority rights and public autonomy: A nonculturalist argument for accommodating ethno‐cultural diversity

“…It is worth emphasizing that the more minority individuals are exposed to such injustices, the more they lose their “self‐confidence” to participate in cross‐cultural deliberations on subjects of general concern (Giladi, 2018, p. 147). Moreover, the more minority communities become reluctant to participate in communicative interactions with the rest of the population, the more they are perceived by wider society as nonnational and particularistic, which further exposes minority individuals to hermeneutical and testimonial injustices.…”