Functional reality of the quasi-real: Gegenstandstheorie and cultural psychology today

Abstract

Cultural psychology is in need for a general theory that includes coverage of both the real actual and the possible realms of psychological phenomena, and of the relationship between the two. The tradition of Gegenstandstheorie developed in Graz in the beginning of the 20th century by Alexius Meinong has direct relevance for theory construction and methodological advancement in this direction. The contrast of existing subsisting and non-existing objects makes it possible to address issues of the study of cultural complexities. The unity of higher and lower order objects in the human psyche makes Meinong's thinking compatible with the needs of our contemporary cultural psychology in its various versions. The limits of Meinong's theory-the ontological primacy of objects and his focus on their classification-can be overcome by introduction of an explicitly developmental focus that his contemporary James Mark Baldwin attempted to formulate in his ''genetic logic.'' Implications of both of these traditions for our contemporary cultural psychologies are outlined, with a focus on the study of patriotism and art.

Culture & Psychology: 25 Constructive years

“…Such “obedience” is the desired goal of all socialization efforts —to get the “receiving objects” (active subjects) into a state of being where minimal social suggestions can produce maximal, self-organized, desired outcome. (Valsiner, 2014d, p. 289)This contrast—the regular “disobedience” of the human psychological phenomena to the efforts to direct the human minds in normatively set directions—requires a new form of science that previous perspectives in psychology have overlooked (Harré, 2015). The assumption on which mutually opposite idea systems have presented the human psyche is in seeing it as an “obedient”—laws-abiding—behavioral or cognitive gadget the behavior of which can be controlled.…”

Lack of Universality of a Psychological Problem: Epistemological Implications on Psychological Problems

“…According to Valsiner (2014), any psychological act thus generates a new totality, a Gegenstand including (a) an assumed set of properties, (b) the object to which the properties refer, and (c) the intentionality of the agent (see also Tateo 2018, p. 5). We can follow this line of reasoning and consider the psychological problem to be the result of an act, given that it is a product of our reflection and imagination.…”

“…However, a psychological problem reveals itself as relevant and real in the universal sense due to the intentionality of the reflection and imagination (which are functions) required by the linguistic agent. According to Valsiner (2014) and Tateo (2018), this matters epistemologically: Once an individual invests in, approaches, or moves towards an object (intentionality), they become Gegenstanden and acquire some specific relational properties with respect to the agent.…”

The psychological imagination

“…In this sense, monologicality is not the refusal of alterity rather the lack of recognition. On the other hand, psychology often deals with non-existing objects (Valsiner, 2014), such as mind, culture, intelligence, identity, self system, personality traits to mention but few. It is often neglected that these constructs are theoretical elaborations build to understand processes, but soon or later they become things through the symbolic artifacts that the discipline develops to measure and talk about them (Tateo, 2013).…”