Aristotle's invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish (boulēsis), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person, who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good, is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of it.
KeywordsAristotle; wish; motivation; teleology; human good; representation
IntroductionA striking feature of Aristotle's psychology is the assumption of a specifically human desire, namely wish (βούλησις). But there is little agreement on the nature, and function, of wish, and even on its most basic characteristics. For instance, despite fairly straightforward evidence for the view that wish is located in the rational part of the soul (DA 3.9, 432b5-6; Top. 4.5, 126a13), there is significant dissent.1 Moreover, no one questions that wish is a desire for the good (τἀγαθόν), but what notion of the good Aristotle has in mind is contested. 2 These disagreements are no wonder, since Aristotle is not particularly explicit about wish, and the evidence is scattered in the corpus. Therefore, with some important exceptions, wish is treated on the sidelines of discussions of Aristotle's psychology, philosophy of action, and ethics. I shall argue that wish is invoked in order to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human end, which fulfils human nature. 4 The idea is that wish is a basic desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates pursuit of what is good for human beings specifically. Wish is, by nature (φύσει), for what is good for human beings (EE 2.10, 1227a28-9). The human good, again, is virtuous activity, which manifests human rational nature, and which is an independent value in the sense that it is not reducible to, or derivable from, objects of other kinds of desire.Although located in the rational part of the soul, wish motivates not only the exercises of the two intellectual virtues, namely theoretical understanding (σοφία) and practical wisdom shall argue, the ultimate motivation to pursue exercises of character virtue is the rational part's desire for the human good.