Function, Homology, and Character Individuation

Abstract

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Conceptual and Empirical Challenges of Ascribing Functions to Transposable Elements

“…However, philosophers have identified numerous biological applications of the CR concept (Brandon 2011) for example in the field of functional morphology (Amundson and Lauder 1994). It is argued that these applications could not be served by an SE concept alone, and that the CR concept is in fact more basic than the SE concept (Griffiths 2006; but see Rosenberg and Neander 2007, Linquist forthcoming). Although these issues are unresolved, many philosophers allow that both SE and CR concepts play appropriate, but distinct epistemic roles.…”

Typology now: homology and developmental constraints explain evolvability

“…But as Alan Love (this issue) makes explicit, developmental processes involve 'function' not in the sense of adaptive function (which pertains to analogy), but in the sense of activity (or causal role). And the phylogeny of activity-functions can be studied and assessed for homology (Amundson and Lauder 1994;Griffiths 1996Griffiths , 2006. From my perspective, developmental processes can be homologues provided that one such developmental process can phenotypically vary and evolve independently of some other developmental processes and some entities on lower or higher levels of organization; and whether a developmental process is a genuine unit of phenotypic evolution can be established by phylogenetic analysis.…”

In What Sense Does ‘Nothing Make Sense Except in the Light of Evolution’?

“…The philosophical consensus is that this is true because the sounds made by the heart did not increase the fitness of our ancestors relative to their evolutionary rivals. But I have come to doubt that this is the only way in which biologists distinguish between function, malfunction and side effect (see particularly Griffiths, 2006). Other recent authors who have departed from this longstanding consensus include Paul Sheldon Davies and Tim Lewens (Davies, 2001;Lewens, 2004).…”

“…In earlier work I have criticized the view that biological parts and processes are defined by their selected function on rather different grounds. I argued that it overlooks the central role of homology in biological classification (Griffiths, 2006(Griffiths, , 2007a2007b). This criticism was first made in an important paper by Ronald Amundson and George Lauder, who suggested that a "a glance in any comparative anatomy textbook" should be enough to refute the view that anatomical parts are defined by the function for which they were selected (Amundson & Lauder, 1994, 453).…”