Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions

Ollár, Mariann; Penta, Antonio

doi:10.1257/aer.20151462

Cited by 47 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…In this regard, a more pragmatic approach to one-step-ahead implementation is needed. One promising possibility seems to be the implementation model developed by Ollár and Penta (2017). These authors circumvents the complications of our mechanisms by studying full implementation via transfer schemes, under general restrictions on agents'beliefs.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

One-step-ahead implementation

Hayashi

Lombardi

2019

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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In many situations, agents are involved in an allocation problem that is followed by another allocation problem whose optimal solution depends on how the former problem has been solved. In this paper, we take this dynamic structure of allocation problems as an institutional constraint. By assuming a …nite number of allocation problems, one for each period/stage, and by assuming that all agents in society are involved in each allocation problem, a dynamic mechanism is a period-by-period process. This process generates at any period-t history a period-t mechanism with observable actions and simultaneous moves. We also assume that the objectives that a planner wants to achieve are summarized in a social choice function (SCF), which maps each state (of the world) into a period-by-period outcome process. In each period t, this process selects for each state a period-t socially optimal outcome conditional on the complete outcome history realized up to period t 1. Heuristically, the SCF is one-step-ahead implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism such that for each state and each realized periodt history, each of its subgame perfect Nash equilibria generates a period-by-period outcome process that coincides with the period-by-period outcome process that the SCF generates at that state from period t onwards. We identify a necessary condition for SCFs to be one-step-ahead implemented, one-step-ahead Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is also su¢ cient under a variant of the condition of no veto-power when there are three or more agents. Finally, we provide an account of welfare implications of one-step-ahead implementability in the contexts of trading decisions and voting problems.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

One-step-ahead implementation

Hayashi

Lombardi

2019

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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“…Adopting the solution concept of Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi [2]), Ollar and Penta [15] provide a characterization of full Δ-implementability for direct mechanisms. Nevertheless, in their setting the state space is a "payoff type space", which is neither the case in the present paper nor in OT.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some recent articles (e.g. Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano [1] and Ollar and Penta [15]) pursue alternative approaches of robust implementation which are neither "global" nor "local". 2 The notion of closeness is defined by following the local interim approach of Weinstein and Yildiz [18].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

Oury

2015

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…See also McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) for related robustness concerns beyond implementation. For other approaches that model versions of global (as opposed to local) robustness, in the sense that the model is tested against a wide class of mispecifications, see, e.g., Morris (2005, 2012), Artemov et al (2013), Ollár and Penta (2017), and Lopomo et al (2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design

2021

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In de Clippel, Saran, and Serrano (2019), it is shown that, perhaps surprisingly, the set of implementable social choice functions is essentially the same whether agents have bounded depth of reasoning or rational expectations. The picture is quite different when taking into account the possibility of small modeling mistakes. While continuous strict implementation becomes very demanding (Oury and Tercieux (2012) -OT), continuity in level-k implementation obtains essentially for free. A decomposition of the conditions implied by the OT implementation notion confirms that it is the use of equilibrium, and not continuity per se, that is responsible for the difference.

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Full Implementation and Belief Restrictions

Cited by 47 publications

References 60 publications

One-step-ahead implementation

One-step-ahead implementation

Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design

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