Fujimori's 1990 Upset Victory in Peru: Electoral Rules, Contingencies, and Adaptive Strategies

Response to Seth E. Masket's review of Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America

“…Some observers of Latin American party transformations have instead attributed them to the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s: the ensuing decline of union strength and informalization of the labor market, they argue, eroded parties' capacity to mobilize supporters through state patronage (Cameron 1994;Roberts 2003Roberts , 2008Schmidt 1996). Along similar lines, Benton (2001Benton ( , 2007 argues that dwindling state coffers meant parties could no longer rely on patronage to form intraparty coalitions, increasing factionalism and weakening party organizations.…”

Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru

“…Beginning in the late 1980s, however, Peru's established parties fell into crisis (Cameron 1994;Cotler 1994;Tanaka 1998;Lynch 1999;Planas 2000). The demise of the old party system is attributable to a variety of factors, including aspects of the electoral system (Schmidt 1996;Tuesta , 1998 and the mistakes of the parties themselves (Lynch 19991. ' The principal roots of the crisis, however, lay in the profound structural challenges the parties faced during the 1980s.…”

“…Fujimori received behind-thescenes support from Alan Garcia, who sought to weaken APRA candidate and internal rival Luis Alva Castro (Schmidt 1996, 342;Lynch 1999, 191). Fujimori also benefited from the mistakes of Vargas Llosa, whose radical neoliberal platform and alliance with traditional conservative elites helped to consolidate an "anyone but Vargas Llosa" vote.8 Finally, the election of an outsider was facilitated by Peru's majority runoff system, which allowed Fujimori to capture the presidency despite finishing second in the first round (Schmidt 1996;Tanaka 1998).…”

Representation By Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy in Latin America

“…Fujimori manipulated his outsider status by positioning himself in the political center and dressing up either in traditional Japanese or indigenous garb. True to neopopulist form, he won the 1990 election by, among other things, appealing directly to voters, especially political independents, the poor working class, the informal sector, and slum dwellers (Schmidt 1996). After closing the legislature and taking control of the judiciary (a move that won widespread approval), Fujimori took advantage of his popularity to call an election in November 1992 for a constituent assembly.…”