Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment

Repeated Interaction and Its Impact on Cooperation and Surplus Allocation—An Experimental Analysis

“…Our paper is also linked to the extensive literature on bargaining experiments, particularly, ultimatum and dictator game experiments (see, e.g., [32,33]; for an overview of the experimental results of these games see [34]). Experimental investigations of these games have been guiding the analysis of other-regarding preferences since the beginning of this literature (see, e.g., [35,36]; for more recent contributions see, e.g., [37,38]). Typically, this literature focuses on the type and the intensity of individual other-regarding preferences that can be concluded from the experimental results of these games.…”

“…Inequity aversion and frustration might play a role too in such a context. It has been shown that frustration decreases the likelihood of accepting what is perceived as an unfair proposal [38], this suggests that sharing information about prior behavior might lead to severe punishment of forecasted allocations perceived as particularly unfair, but also that agents might become more prone to punishment, when trust has been betrayed (for example when trust from a receiver has been repaid by a low offer from a distributor).…”

Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game

“…Among the relevant belief-dependent preferences, we mainly focus on guilt aversion, which seems to be the prevailing motivation in the Trust Minigame (see, among others, Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Attanasi et al 2013, andBellemare et al 2017). 3 First, we put forward a theoretical model with role-dependent guilt aversion that highlights how incomplete information on the belief-dependent preferences of the trustee may give rise to reputation building phenomena. We adopt a multi-period model where the trustee experiences guilt (if he defects) at the end of each period of the repeated game and the trustor's disappointment refers to his expectations at the beginning of each period (cf.…”

“…SeeMailath and Samuelson (2006) and the references therein 2. Or finitely repeated games where the stage game has multiple equilibria 3. We model guilt aversion as the aversion to disappoint others, as inBattigalli and Dufwenberg (2007).…”

Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: An experiment

“…Similarly, expectation-based models such as the one proposed by Rabin (1993) do not predict any exit. The timing of the exit decision marks a difference also from two recent experimental studies (Aina et al, 2018;Persson, 2018) testing the theoretical framework by Battigalli et al (2018). In fact, in both studies the antisocial behavior follows the realization of the outcome.…”