From Times to Worlds and Back Again

Giordani, Alessandro; Costa, Damiano

doi:10.1002/tht3.79

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Examples of heterodox endurantism are Fine's three‐dimensionalism (Fine ), according to which existence‐at‐a‐time and location are two primitive relations, and transcendentism, according to which location is primitive and existence‐at‐a‐time is not (Costa forth. ; Giordani and Costa ).…”

Section: Endurantism Vs Perdurantismmentioning

confidence: 95%

Relativity and Three Four‐dimensionalisms

2016

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Relativity theory is often said to support something called 'the four-dimensional view of reality'. But there are at least three different views that sometimes go by this name. One is 'spacetime unitism' (as we call it), according to which there is a spacetime manifold, and if there are such things as points of space or instants of time, these are just spacetime regions of different sorts: thus space and time are not separate manifolds. A second is the B-theory of time, according to which the past, present, and future are all equally real and there is nothing metaphysically special about the present. A third is perdurantism, according to which persisting material objects (rocks, trees, and human beings) are made up of different temporal parts located at different times. We sketch routes from relativity to unitism and to the B-theory. We then discuss some routes to perdurantism, via the B-theory and via unitism.104 Relativity and Three Four-dimensionalisms

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Section: Endurantism Vs Perdurantismmentioning

confidence: 95%

Relativity and Three Four‐dimensionalisms

2016

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“…Celem artykułu jest, po pierwsze, rekonstrukcja i krytyczna analiza stanowiska inwariantystycznego Simonsa, a po drugie, zestawienie jej z inną propozycją teoretyczną, mianowicie z transcendentyzmem -kolejną konkurencyjną koncepcją trwania w czasie, wysuniętą niedawno przez Damiano Costę i Alessandro Giordaniego (Costa 2014, Giordani, Costa 2013. Za pomocą prostej analizy porównawczej postaram się wykazać, że koncepcje te są stanowiskami zbieżnymi: różnią się w kilku rozstrzygnięciach, które są bądź zaniedbywalne, bądź mogłyby być zaakceptowane na gruncie obu koncepcjiz wyjątkiem wszakże jednego, acz istotnego elementu.…”

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Inwariantyzm a transcendentyzm

Grygianiec

2019

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INVARIANTISM AND TRANSCENDENTISM In a number of works, Peter Simons proposed an interesting theory of persistence in time, which he sometimes describes as invariantism. Unfortunately, in the last two decades, despite its unquestionable merits, invariantism has attracted little interest among thinkers engaged in the debate over persistence. The debate continues to revolve around well-known solutions, i.e., endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. It seems to ignore the efforts of the few thinkers who try to break the theoretical deadlock that has for many years dominated the discussion. The purpose of this article is, first, to reconstruct and critically analyze Simons' invariantist theory, and second, to compare it with another theoretical proposal, namely transcendentism, recently advanced by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani. By means of a simple comparative analysis, I shall try to show that these views are convergent: they differ only in a few elements that are either negligible or could be accepted within both theories. This result should not, however, be interpreted as an attempt to formulate a hybrid position. On the one hand, transcendentism can be treated, to some extent, as a fairly natural foundation of invariantism, whereas invariantism can be regarded as a technical development of transcendentism (providing it with a suitable remedy for some interpretative difficulties). On the other hand, invariantism and transcendentism interpret temporal location of objects completely differently, and so, at the end of the day, their paths must diverge. The indirect aim of the paper is to show that both invariantism and transcendentism should no longer be ignored in the debate on the nature of persistence.

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Times, Worlds and Locations

Miller

2013

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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In 'from times to worlds and back again: a transcendentist theory of persistence' (henceforth TTP) Alessandro Giordani and Damiano Costa outline five competitor views regarding the manner in which objects occupy 1 regions along a dimension. These are: (1) classical uni-location, (2) bare uni-location, (3) multi-location, (4) counterpart presence and (5) transcendent presence. Each view comes in both a temporal and modal version and Giordani and Costa argue that one ought to prefer transcendentism (i.e., 5) along both dimensions. According to temporal transcendentism, necessarily, no object is exactly located at any region along the temporal dimension. Instead, any object, O, is derivatively present at some region, R, along the temporal dimension in virtue of bearing certain relations to something (according to TTP an event) that occupies R along that dimension. According to modal transcendentism, no object is exactly located at any region along the modal dimension. Instead, any object, O, is derivatively present at some region, R, along the modal dimension in virtue of bearing certain relations to something (according to TTP an event) that occupies R along that dimension.Before evaluating transcendentism it is worth distinguishing two different questions one might ask. The first is a metaphysical question: if an object occupies a region that is extended along some dimension, D, then in what manner does that object occupy that region? Answers to this question offer a metaphysics of occupation. The second is a semantic question: what are the truth conditions for certain ordinary temporal and modal claims about objects? Answers to this question provide a temporal or modal semantics.This article has two aims: first, to elucidate transcendentism and, second, to determine whether it offers a novel answer to either the metaphysical or the semantic question. With respect to the first question it will be argued that it does not. With respect to the second, it will be argued that perhaps, if one accepts additional, seemingly controversial, claims about the semantics of ordinary language, transcendentism offers a novel semantics for such claims. It remains, however, unclear whether such ancillary claims ought be accepted and thus unclear whether transcendentism is well motivated.Let us briefly recap the five views as they are presented in TTP. Classical uni-location is the view that objects exactly occupy 2 a single region and occupy 3 any proper subregion thereof by having a proper part that exactly occupies that subregion.

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From Times to Worlds and Back Again

Cited by 7 publications

References 17 publications

Relativity and Three Four‐dimensionalisms

Relativity and Three Four‐dimensionalisms

Inwariantyzm a transcendentyzm

Times, Worlds and Locations

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