2008
DOI: 10.1080/01611190802319036
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From the Archives: Inside a Cold War Crypto Cell. Polish Cipher Bureau in the 1980s

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“…95, with further amendments). 3 The OTP (in Polish: gama losowa) is a string of random characters with no correlation between them. (A footnote of the original document).…”
Section: The Documentmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…95, with further amendments). 3 The OTP (in Polish: gama losowa) is a string of random characters with no correlation between them. (A footnote of the original document).…”
Section: The Documentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Among these, there are documents related to the ''civilian'' communist Polish SIGINT, which, from the 1960s untill its dissolution after the regime change of 1989, consisted of the communications interception branch known as Warsaw's Ministry of Interior Bureau ''RKW'' 1 and Section II of MoI's Cipher Bureau (i.e., MoI's Bureau ''A''), which was responsible specifically for code breaking efforts. More information on communist Polish SIGINT can be found in [3].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It remains unattested in the sources whether such messages, addressed to Department I outposts abroad or to the assets, were superenciphered by Section IV for additional security. 31 30 More information on the DUDEK series of teleprinter encryption devices can be found in [22]. 31 More information on the duties and operations of the Independent Section ''S'' can be found in [8].…”
Section: J Burymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Remarkably, Section II's personnel were directly involved at the time in ''intelligence ventures'' or interrogation of suspected spies to grab crypto-related material. 22 The document also listed the equipment used by Section II in its work and codebreaking activities, such as the analysis of three Hagelin mechanical encryption machines, likely the C-52 or CX-52, delivered to Warsaw by Czech StB officers for evaluation, which, according to the account, enabled breaking the code. Albeit, the source did not specify the scope of this achievement.…”
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confidence: 99%
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