From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points

Kyriacou, Christos

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93369-6_4

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Griffiths and Wilkins' success in meeting the challenge is questionable. Kyriacou (2018) responds that the number of unsalvageable commonsense beliefs is large enough to topple the structure which Griffiths and Wilkins sought to build, namely that of grounding scientific beliefs. Kyriacou concludes that debunkers are required to clarify their meta-epistemological commitments, as their argument faces many challenges.…”

Section: Containing the Univer Sal Acidmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

Davis

Cox

2022

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Attempts to debunk evolutionary debunking arguments are not new. Nor is it new to demonstrate how they smuggle old wine into new bottles in the form of metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. 1 What we demonstrate here is the deeper implication of these claims, namely that evolutionary debunking is undermined as a standalone metaethical argument strategy.We begin first by setting out the deep structure of evolutionary debunking argument strategies and explaining what we mean when we say that metaphysical and epistemological conclusions must be assumed or preestablished in order for them to succeed. We will then illustrate how these conclusions are assumed in the debunking literature by examining a particular debate in this literature, the demarcation challenge.

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Section: Containing the Univer Sal Acidmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

Davis

Cox

2022

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“…11 See Kyriacou (2018, forthcoming-b). 12 See Hale (2014:60-2) and Leech (2015) for absolute logical necessities and Kyriacou (2018) for epistemic necessities.…”

Section: Kyriacoumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12 12 See Hale (2014:60–2) and Leech (2015) for absolute logical necessities and Kyriacou (2018) for epistemic necessities. However, as an anonymous referee has suggested, some philosophers has presented counterexamples to modus ponens, such as Lycan (2001).…”

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confidence: 99%

‘Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II’

Kyriacou

2021

Philosophy Compass

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I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditional. On the non‐traditional side are fallibilist science‐based skepticism (which relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge) and practical skepticism (which questions the intellectual character of the standard of knowledge) and on the traditional side high‐standard/infallibilist. I then briefly present and discuss representatives of each category.

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“…7 7 See recent work along infallibilist lines by Dodd (2011), Kyriacou (2017, 2018, 2019a, 2019b, forthcoming‐a, forthcoming‐b), Stoutenburg (2017, forthcoming), Climenhaga (forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

“…16 16 For theoretically indispensable norms of epistemic rationality, see Kyriacou (2018, forthcoming‐b). …”

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Varieties of skeptical invariantism II

Kyriacou

2021

Philosophy Compass

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Abstarct In the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science‐based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science‐based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still questions parts of our everyday knowledge on the basis of scientific reasons. In particular, we presented Frances’ (2005) ‘live’ skepticism and Hannon's (forthcoming) ‘hard‐hitting’ skepticism. In this second installment, we present the two other varieties of skeptical invariantism we identified: traditional skepticism (high‐standard and infallibilist) that respects all three commitments (intellectualism, invariantism, stringency) and practical skepticism that questions the intellectualist commitment.

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From Moral Fixed Points to Epistemic Fixed Points

Cited by 9 publications

References 37 publications

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

‘Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II’

Varieties of skeptical invariantism II

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