Varieties of skeptical invariantism II

Abstract

Abstarct In the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science‐based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science‐based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still questions parts of our everyday knowledge on the basis of scientific reasons. In particular, we presented Frances’ (2005) ‘live’ skepticism and Hannon's (forthcoming) ‘hard‐hitting’ skepticism. In this second installment, we present the two other varieties of skeptical invariantism we identified: traditional skepticism (high‐standard and infallibilist) that respects all three commitments (intellectualism, invariantism, stringency) and practical skepticism that questions the intellectualist commitment.