From Kyoto to the WTO: Evaluating the Constitutional Legitimacy of the Provinces in Canadian Foreign Trade and Environmental Policy

Abstract

Abstract.The Kyoto Protocol was a controversial issue within Canadian federalism, especially in Alberta, where the province considered a formal constitutional challenge regarding the implementation of the agreement. This option was not pursued, however, due to existing judicial precedent that limits the jurisdictional authority of the provinces in international affairs. Regardless, these rulings still suggest a level of constitutional ambiguity, which creates motivation for federal-provincial cooperation on foreign trade and environmental policy. As a result, highly valued formalized consultative mechanisms have developed in these issue areas during the past two decades. Ottawa's decision to ratify Kyoto, however, represented a significant departure from previous practices of cooperative federalism. In pursuing the protocol as part of his legacy agenda, Chrétien was aware of the provinces' tenuous constitutional status. It is important to note, however, that the resulting tension between both levels of government was atypical and does not threaten the viability of cooperative federalism in the near future.Résumé.Le protocole de Kyoto a suscité de nombreuses controverses au sein du fédéralisme canadien, en particulier en Alberta où le gouvernement songea même à contester formellement la constitutionnalité de sa mise en oeuvre. En définitive, il a abandonné cette option en raison de précédents jurisprudentiels qui limitent la juridiction des provinces en affaires internationales. Ces décisions suggèrent néanmoins qu'il existe un certain niveau d'ambiguïté constitutionnelle propre à motiver une attitude de coopération fédérale-provinciale en matière d'environnement et de commerce extérieur. De ce fait, des mécanismes consultatifs très structurés ont été mis au point dans ces domaines au cours des deux dernières décennies. Or, la décision d'Ottawa de ratifier Kyoto contrastait nettement avec les pratiques antérieures de fédéralisme coopératif. En cherchant à faire du Protocole de Kyoto un élément de son héritage, Chrétien était conscient de la fragilité des arguments constitutionnels des provinces. Cependant, il est important de noter que la tension ainsi créée entre les deux niveaux de gouvernement était atypique et qu'elle ne menace pas la validité du fédéralisme coopératif dans l'avenir.

The New International Health Regulations and the Federalism Dilemma

“…For example, the GATT/WTO agreement included a federal clause which states that “[e]ach contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territory”. However, there has been variability in the interpretation of this clause, with certain countries claiming that this requires the use of any constitutional power available to adhere to the agreement, and others arguing that this clause should not allow internal federal structures to be compromised [ 18 , 19 ]. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has generated similar challenges to implementation in federal states, and it is notable that two key federations, the US and Australia, have not ratified the treaty [ 20 ].…”

Tracking Environmental Crime Through CEPA: Canada's Environment Cops or Industry's Best Friend?

“…Resistance from business interests and provincial governments -sometimes allied, sometimes independent or opposed -has produced decades of lawsuits and constitutional challenges. The 1998 Canada Accord on Environmental Harmonization, allowing federal authority to be ceded to provincial authorities if provincial legislation is deemed equivalent, (Van Nijnatten 1999;Kukucha 2005) has given provincial governments legal grounds to challenge any provisions they dislike despite the fact that it was designed to resolve jurisdictional overlap once and for all (Douglas and Hébert 1998). While some provinces have excellent environmental legislation and well-equipped staff, others do not, and environmental policies can change with every election.…”

“…This investigation uses data from records produced by Environment Canada from 1988-2005, including information posted online by its Hydro-Quebec (1997) and Imperial Oil Ltd v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment) (2003), described in DeMarco and Campbell 2004;Kukucha 2005. enforcement division, the Environmental Law Enforcement Program (www.ec.gc.ca/ele-ale/), and from CEPA Annual Reports from 1990-2005 (www.ec.gc.ca). Additional data were gathered through university library archives, and from contacts at Environment Canada.…”

Canadian Interstate Federalism and Economic Globalization

“…National borders remain the most relevant to FDI, and the federal government is responsible for setting the general terms by which the national economy will operate (Luz & Miller, 2002 p.975;Mahler, 1987 p.109). Control over monetary policy has obviously remained with the federal government, as has the trade and commerce power, which the Supreme Court has expanded upon since 1949 (Kukucha, 2005 p.129).…”

“…Ontario's oppositions to the FTA under Peterson and the NAFTA under Rae were soon reversed by the Progressive Conservative government which embraced the market and tried to increase the province's competitiveness(Courchene, 1999 p.19). Although not a trade agreement, Alberta's vocal opposition to the Kyoto Accord was quieted prior to federal ratification through conferences similar to those used to negotiate trade positions(Kukucha, 2005 pp.146-148).Provincial involvement provides valuable information on affected industries and regional interests, which may be costly to obtain otherwise(Brown, 1991 p.94). With growing exposure to the international market, a number of the provinces have formed significant trade links of their own.…”