FromOstpolitikto ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia

Abstract

Germany's relationship with Russia has historically been one of the most crucial in shaping Europe's fate. Despite radical transformation in the nature of European Great Power politics, it continues to be pertinent from the perspective of today's world. Germany's willingness to establish good relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s—its emphasis on economic relations and cooperation instead of political disagreements—prepared the ground for the end of the Cold War and German unification twenty years later. Germany's basic policy towards Russia remained broadly unchanged despite German unification and changes in the domestic political coalitions and leadership, sometimes against political expectations. In the European context, Germany's attitude towards Russia created the backbone of EU–Russia relations. During 2012–13, however, the continuity in Germany's policy towards Russia was seen as having come to an end. Political twists came to the fore and the atmosphere was loaded with tensions, made worse by the Ukrainian crisis. This article reviews the recent, alleged changes in Germany's policy towards Russia during the Merkel era. It asks two basic questions: first, whether Germany's policy really has changed and if it has, what are the theoretical tools that give us the best potential understanding of these changes? The article argues that the policy has changed, but not as dramatically as made out by some headlines. Moreover, the article suggests that a key element in analysing the degree of change in Germany's policy towards Russia is neither the external power relations nor domestic politics and related changes in the prevailing interpretation of national interest, though these are important too, but the interaction between the leaders and foreign policy elites.

Learning to Lead? Germany and the Leadership Paradox in EU Foreign Policy

“…No country felt this more keenly than Germany, whose post-cold war grand strategy was based on the assumption that globalisation was shaping a more cooperative and peaceful global order (Bagger 2019). Russia's transformation from a 'partner in modernisation' to a strategic competitor and military security threat was felt particularly acutely in Germany (Forsberg 2016). Given its central geostrategic location in the heart of Europe between East and West (Klinke 2018), and its complex and many-layered relationship with Russiawhich embraces diplomatic relations, trade, security and foreign policy, as well as culture and historical memory (Siddi 2017)the Federal Republic felt compelled to play a leading role in managing the crisis, and in formulating a strategic response to Russian aggression (Fix 2018).…”

The Ukraine Conflict: Russia's Challenge to European Security Governance

“…974-5]. Germany has taken the lead in Europe's response to the Ukraine crisis but Berlin has been reticent about the military response and ruled out a permanent NATO deployment to the east as a violation of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, thereby upsetting its eastern neighbours, who argue that it constitutes a weak deterrent capability which may embolden Moscow to test the Alliance further [Speck 2015; see also Forsberg 2016]. The VHRJTF itself may be a 'powerful Allied symbol' but constitutes a relatively modest force; it has an uncertain political-military rationale and may face logistical problems which makes it unsuited for the potential challenges NATO's emphasis on collective defence and deterrence does not address the central problem of the institutional decay in the NATO-Russia relationship and the vacuum in security governance in the neighbourhood.…”

Geopolitics versus geoeconomics: the case of Russia's geostrategy and its effects on the EU

“…Germany's 'strategic partnership' with Russia has been built on these sectoral economic interests, and has been a prominent factor in undermining the EU's ability to form a coherent and unified Russia policy. 112 As Forsberg notes, while the debate continues, with many still advocating a role for Germany as Russia's interlocutor in Europe, 'the climate of opinion among the foreign policy elite changed definitely', 113 and support for the government's new foreign policy line among both the German public and German industry has strengthened as the crisis has unfolded. Third, the centripetal forces set in motion by Russian geopolitics can be noted in a tendency towards a more cohesive EU foreign policy.…”