From enactive phenomenology to biosemiotic enactivism

Abstract

Autopoietic enactivism (AE) is a relatively young but increasingly influential approach within embodied cognitive science, which aims to offer a viable alternative framework to mainstream cognitivism. Similarly, in biology, the nascent field of biosemiotics has steadily been developing an increasingly influential alternative framework to mainstream biology. Despite sharing common objectives and clear theoretical overlap, there has to date been little to no exchange between the two fields. This paper takes this under-appreciated overlap as not only a much needed call to begin building bridges between the two areas but also as an opportunity to explore how AE could benefit from biosemiotics. As a first tentative step towards this end, the paper will draw from both fields to develop a novel synthesis-biosemiotic enactivism-which aims to clarify, develop and ultimately strengthen some key AE concepts. The paper has two main goals: (i) to propose a novel conception of cognition that could contribute to the ongoing theoretical developments of AE and (ii) to introduce some concepts and ideas from biosemiotics to the enactive community in order to stimulate further debate across the two fields.

Justifying Moral Standing by Biosemiotic Particularism

“…Similar views of living organisms as meaning-makers is prominent within some traditions within enactivism (e.g. Di Paolo and Thompson (2013), particularly the autopoietic enactivism of Maturana and Varela (1992) (see also De Jesus 2016), as well as in cognitive semiotics (see Zlatev 2009). Further, this meaning-making is morally relevant.…”

Combinations and Connections: Reaching Across Disciplinary Boundaries

“…And “Clark (2001, pp. 118–119) points out that by exclusively focusing on unity and similarity, that which is ‘special and distinctive’ is lost sight of” (De Jesus, 2016, p. 134). I certainly did not intend to downplay the unique contribution of CA.…”

Specifying the conditions for a theory of teleology in cognitive science.

“…kind have already taken place in much greater depth elsewhere (see De Jesus, 2016;Thompson, 2007;Weber & Varela, 2002). Instead, what I plan to do here is to present a conceptual account of the enactivist position and show how it is able to meet the criteria of nonreduction that I have outlined in this article.…”

“…Materialism is perhaps the most philosophically challenging-and, as I plan to show, crucial-condition of reduction to refute. The prototypical strategy employed by enactivists for refuting materialism can be traced to Weber and Varela's (2002) merging of the theory of autopoiesis with Jonas' (1966) phenomenology of the organism (see Barbaras, 2010;De Jesus, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.…”

“…Conversely, the other option is to uphold naturalism by explaining the functionality of the mind in deterministic, causal terms; yet the obvious issue with this option, for the nonreductionist, is that it explains teleology away and therefore slips into the very position it is seeking to refute: reductionism. Hence, if approaches like enactivism are to salvage their vision of naturalizing the mind without also relinquishing their commitment to nonreductionism, they must account for the teleological character around which both consciousness and cognition appear to be organized by discovering a yet undisclosed, third option that makes it possible to productively circumvent the tension between naturalism, on the one hand, and nonreductionism, on the other (De Jesus, 2016; Hovhannisyan & Dewey, 2017; Thompson, 2004; Weber & Varela, 2002).…”