From Donorship to Ownership? Budget Support and Donor Influence in Rwanda and Tanzania

Swedlund, Haley J.

doi:10.1002/pad.1665

Cited by 36 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Yet, rather than fostering recipient‐country ownership, budget support has been critiqued as simply masking new forms of conditionality and increasing donor influence in recipient countries (i.e. de Renzio, 2006; Hayman, 2011a; Swedlund, 2013b). This raises the question of whether budget support was simply a guise for increasing donor control over aid funds.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid

Swedlund¹,

Lierl

2020

Development Policy Review

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Motivation: Budget support is the form of aid most commonly associated with recipient-country ownership. However, a number of scholars and practitioners have criticized the approach as masking new forms of conditionality. Was budget support simply a guise for increasing donor influence in recipient countries? How can we explain the rapid shift towards budget support, as well as the rapid decline in its popularity after only a few years? Purpose: We use a bargaining framework to explain the rise and fall of budget support. Contrary to explanations that suggest that budget support was a normative decision by donors designed to increase aid effectiveness by fostering ownership, a bargaining framework emphasizes that aid policy is the result of sustained negotiations between donors and recipients. These negotiations, however, are constrained by donors' inability to deliver aid as promised. Approach: We use a Nash bargaining framework to formalize the predictions of a bargaining model. From the model, two testable predictions emerge: (1) in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments are willing to selectively offer donor agencies greater access to and influence over domestic policy decision-making; and (2) in exchange for such influence, donor agencies are willing to exert less pressure on recipients to be politically inclusive. We then test the implications of the model using case-study evidence from Rwanda and Tanzania. Findings: The empirical data, based on over 80 interviews with practitioners over several periods of research in both countries, provide substantial evidence in support of the model's core assumptions and predictions. Contrary to claims that budget support increased recipient-country ownership, interviews (identified as personal communications) suggest that, in exchange for more credible commitments, recipient governments were willing to grant donors greater access and influence. In return, donor agencies reduced demands on the recipient government regarding political inclusivity, tacitly accepting arrangements that centralized decision-making and excluded civil society. When donor agencies could no longer provide budget support as promised, these negotiated arrangements broke down. Policy Implications: The findings challenge a common narrative that donors embraced budget support because of a normative commitment to ownership. They also demonstrate the value of a bargaining framework.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid

Swedlund¹,

Lierl

2020

Development Policy Review

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Third, it aims at becoming a middle-income country by 2025, and the prospects for reaching this goal have considerably improved with the discovery of large amounts of natural gas. There are signs that the Tanzanian government is gradually moving away from its tradition of being a compliant development partner to taking a more self-assured stand (Swedlund 2013). Through examples of concrete processes, we argue that, although women's organizations and donors played a central role in making gender-related policies in the1990s, their opportunities for doing so in the 2010s are far more limited.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Partnership, Policy Making, and Conditionality in Gender Field: The Case of Tanzania

Lange¹,

Tjomsland²

2014

Africa Today

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Partnership is the overarching framework for development cooperation, but it has been criticized for furthering priorities of the North, rather than those of the South. This article discusses partnership in Tanzania with a special focus on policy making to enhance rights and gender equality. The late 1990s have been described as an era when successful partnerships ensured laws friendly to women, but our analysis of policy making in the 2010s shows that the process consumes far more time now and is harder to accomplish. We argue that this is because the current issues are more controversial, challenging cultural norms, and perhaps because the government realistically envisages a future without aid and is less willing to let partners influence its policies.

show abstract

“…Moreover, it signals to citizens a form of international backing. Budget support is perhaps the most obvious form of implicit political support for dominant elites, even if donors have sought to use it as leverage for policy influence (Swedlund, ). When legitimation targets incumbent actors, it strengthens the existing political settlement.…”

Section: Types Of Aid Influence In Political Settlementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role and Responsibility of Foreign Aid in Recipient Political Settlements

Yanguas

2017

J. Int. Dev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article revisits the basic concept of political settlement by using an incumbent–challenger ideal type, and defines the mechanisms through which a settlement is influenced by foreign aid: diffusion, legitimation and brokerage. The new framework illustrates how aid may support continuity or change and allows for an interrogation of the ethical implications of donor choices. Challenging the implicit utilitarianism prevalent in current agendas and practices in the development community, this analysis highlights the inescapable value judgements that must guide international assistance, despite the significant structural incentives to focus on supposedly calculable risks and results. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

From Donorship to Ownership? Budget Support and Donor Influence in Rwanda and Tanzania

Cited by 36 publications

References 20 publications

The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid

The rise and fall of budget support: Ownership, bargaining and donor commitment problems in foreign aid

Partnership, Policy Making, and Conditionality in Gender Field: The Case of Tanzania

The Role and Responsibility of Foreign Aid in Recipient Political Settlements

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About