From cryptocurrencies to cryptocourts: blockchain and the financialization of dispute resolution platforms

Abstract

This paper contributes to emerging discussions of blockchain governance through an analysis of dispute resolution platforms that reimagine justice. We focus specifically on Kleros, a blockchain-enabled dispute resolution platform, that promises to secure, authenticate, and democratize access to justice for the twenty-first century. We advance the concept of cryptocourts whereby jurors, incentivized by accumulating cryptocurrency, rapidly mobilize using principles of on-demand crowdsourcing to resolve disputes. We critique the broader social imaginaries that cryptocourts such as Kleros will result in a more open, trustworthy, transparent, and democratic systems of justice. These platforms instead pose important questions concerning their potential impact on civil dispute resolution practices by embedding it within an economy of cryptocurrency speculation. This ostensibly results in a legal infrastructure founded on principles of financial acquisition that positions jurors as economic agents seeking to profit from disputes, and courts as computational systems that merely authenticate and secure the distribution of evidence and verdicts.

Identifying and ranking critical success factors for digital court

“…(2018), Gerry et al. (2018), Sung (2020), Nellis (2017) Dylag and Smith (2023), Singh et al. (2018), Parkin and Wedeking (2017) and Al Swelmiyeen and Al-Nuemat (2016).…”

Inmuebles virtuales y perspectivas innovadoras de resolución de conflictos en el metaverso

“…La doctrina se ha referido a las nuevas plataformas descentralizadas de resolución de conflictos como BDR (Blockchain Dispute Resolution), 99 smart dispute resolution; 100 109 y también, on-chain ADR procedures which utilize enforcement via blockchain. 110 Estas expresiones tienen en común la de ir referidas a mecanismos de resolución de conflictos intra-blockchain donde las identidades, tanto de las partes litigantes como de los árbitros, suelen permanecer anónimas o pseudoanónimas. 111 Las plataformas de BDR generalmente se estructuran como DAOs, esto es, como organizaciones descentralizadas dirigidas y mantenidas por una comunidad de participantes.…”

Blockchain crowdsourced arbitration in construction project delay resolution

“…Crowdsourced dispute resolution can be both offline and online. Blockchain-enabled online dispute resolution service, or "cryptocourt" as termed by [20] is a form of online crowdsourced arbitration). With the advent of Blockchain technology, online Blockchain dispute resolution become an effective tool for solving conflicts with lower risk of manipulation.…”

“…This game-theory based principle is called Schelling Point [21], it prevents voters from making random choices and encourages them to put reasonable efforts in the process of problem solving. Essentially, Schelling Point provides cryptocourts a "mathematical justification" for risk evaluation and abstract decision-making [20]. Other networks like Aragon [23] add another layer of game-theory in the principle of eliminating juror bribery and favoring honest jurors over malicious ones by requiring jury members to enter an agreement to delate the bribing party and vote for the opposite side in the event either party attempts to bribe the jury.…”