Russia's (and the USSR's) use of sports mega-events (SMEs) makes this BRICS country (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) not only an outlier among emerging states, but also among key SME hosts generally. In this paper the authors argue that both the historic Moscow Olympics (1980) and the more recent hosting of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics provide evidence that Russia has, on both occasions, focused on geopolitical priorities using hard power (military might) at the expense of soft power acquisition. Further, the authors advance the notion that first and foremost both Olympics were used to pursue domestic soft power goals, which, again, makes Russia an outlier in terms of the political use of sports mega-events by states in the literature on this subject. The 1980 Olympic Games, therefore, in terms of their potential to generate soft power and national unity, turned out to be a mis-used opportunity for Russia. The authors explore the extent to which this is specific to Russia and whether the first Russian Olympics could provide valuable insight into the modern-day hosting of sports megaevents by Russia (2014Russia ( /2018