From “blood transfusion” to “hematopoiesis”: watershed eco-compensation in China

Li, Xiuhong; Wang, Yizhuo; Yang, Rongjin; Zhang, Le; Zhang, Yi; Liu, Qiang; Song, Zhenwei

doi:10.1007/s11356-022-20876-w

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…The command-control strategy is guided by Pigouvian taxation and emphasizes intensive control by the government as the principal agent [52,53]. Many studies focus on the economic-incentive of PES programs [34,54], ignoring the fact that PES programs are implemented with incentive-command compatibility based on local economic and social conditions. The watershed ecological compensation of the Xin'an River Basin is the typical PES program with both economic-incentive and command-control compatibility.…”

Section: Pes Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That is, differences in farmers' preferences for different strategies within the same PES program [31,32]. Although PES programs with blood transfusion, industrial development, and professional employment of the labor force are more durable than those with cash compensation [33,34], farmers are inclined to choose the latter, cash compensation [35]. Hence, many scholars have researched compensation standards and indicated that reasonable compensation standards mobilized farmers to participate in PES programs [36,37].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Heterogeneity Impacts of Farmers’ Participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services Based on the Collective Action Framework

Zhang

Cao

et al. 2022

Land

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Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are designed to reduce the impact of human activities on eco-sensitive areas. PES programs often adopt economic-incentive and command-control strategies. Increasing the enthusiasm of farmers’ participation is crucial for the sustainability of PES programs and ecosystem restoration. The watershed ecological compensation in Xin’an River Basin is the first horizontal ecological compensation pilot in China. In this study, economic-incentive strategy and command-control strategies in living and farming are implemented simultaneously to improve water quality. Under the collective action framework, we analyze the drivers of farmers’ participation in three concurrent strategies using hierarchical linear models (HLM). The results show: (1) Overall, 81.79%, 76.26%, and 79.11% of farmers are willing to participate in economic-incentive strategy, command-control strategy in living, and command-control strategy in farming, respectively, while 18.21%, 23.74%, and 20.89% are from the village level. (2) Among statistically significant (p < 0.01) factors at the farmer level, social trust (β = 0.305), and social participation (β = 0.134) have positive effects on the economic-incentive strategy; the number of communication and entertainment equipment has a positive effect on the willingness to participate in command-control strategy in living (β = 0.287) and command-control strategy in farming (β = 0.336). (3) At the village level, village characteristics have a direct impact on the farmers’ willingness to participate in strategies. Village woodland area is positively correlated with strategies participation. In addition, village characteristics play a moderating role by influencing farmers’ sustainable livelihood capital. We conclude that different concurrent strategies and collective actions need to be considered in the design of PES programs, particularly in ecologically sensitive areas, which can enrich the theory of collective action and the connotation of PES.

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Section: Pes Programmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Heterogeneity Impacts of Farmers’ Participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services Based on the Collective Action Framework

Zhang

Cao

et al. 2022

Land

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Therefore, PWES management should be more inclusive, incorporating the public into the management system and providing the public with information on watershed governance, thus motivating people to participate in PWES management. Due to the weak ability and awareness of the public regarding access to information, certain strategies are still needed for policy advocacy and knowledge dissemination related to PWES [19]. The government plays an irreplaceable role in PWES implementation, and the public may place higher demands on the government's transparency and execution.…”

Section: Implication For Policy and Watershed Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…PES schemes are usually packaged as a series of social visions [13][14][15]. PES is considered to be the equivalent concept to ecological compensation in China and has been applied in different types of areas such as watersheds, forests, and wetlands [16][17][18][19][20].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Payments for Watershed Ecosystem Services in the Eyes of the Public, China

Chen

Lü

2022

Sustainability

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Recent decades have witnessed an increased development of schemes for payment for watershed ecosystem services (PWES). However, the public is usually excluded from PWES systems. Reliable and empirical research on PWES from the public perspective is scarce. Aiming to understand public perceptions, attitudes, participation, and responses to PWES, this paper investigated local residents living in the Yongding River watershed area through a face-to-face questionnaire survey. The results showed that the public had limited knowledge of PWES. The public was keen to be involved in PWES decision-making, but the current level of public participation was very low. Regarding willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), nearly 55% of the respondents supported paying the upstream residents for protecting the environment if they were beneficiaries in the downstream areas, while 85% of the respondents agreed to accept compensation if they were contributors to environmental improvement in the upstream areas. Although some of the respondents’ daily lives were affected by the watershed environment, they were reluctant to pay, reflecting a sign of “free-riding”. The regression analysis showed that public concerns, values, knowledge of PWES and the watershed environment, and demographic factors determined the WTP and WTA. The results of the contingent valuation method and opportunity costs method showed that the annual payment for headwater conservation areas (Huailai and Yanqing) ranged from CNY 245 to 718 million (USD 36 to 106 million). This study contributes to our limited knowledge and understanding of public sentiment and makes recommendations for improving public receptivity to PWES.

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Inter-provincial Diversified Ecological Compensation Collaborative Governance

Yao

Fan

Zhai

2022

Water Resour Manage

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Establishing a diversified ecological compensation mechanism for inter-provincial river basins is an important measure to effectively balance the relationship between water quality protection and economic development. However, in the practice of diversified ecological compensation of river basin water ecology, the conflicts of interests and contradictions between upstream and downstream governments in water resources management and protection become an important obstacle to the sustainable development of the river basin. To solve the above problems, this paper proposes the operation mode of a diversified ecological compensation mechanism based on collaborative governance among local governments, to promote the diversified ecological compensation mechanism to effectively match the demands of interest subjects and dynamically adjust the combination of compensation methods. The evolutionary game model of diversified ecological compensation cooperative governance between upstream and downstream governments is constructed, the dynamic simulation analysis is carried out by taking Shaanxi and Henan provinces as examples. The results show that the higher the initial willingness of upstream governments to diversify ecological compensation, the faster the stability of the collaborative governance system. When the fund allocation ratio of the diversified compensation method is biased to the government compensation, the stable state of the system can be achieved faster. The agreement guarantee cost has a greater impact on the upstream government, and it is easier to achieve system stability when the revenue distribution ratio is biased toward the downstream government. A good incentive and constraint mechanism can effectively promote the the system' stability and have a more significant impact on the downstream government.

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From “blood transfusion” to “hematopoiesis”: watershed eco-compensation in China

Cited by 10 publications

References 26 publications

Heterogeneity Impacts of Farmers’ Participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services Based on the Collective Action Framework

Heterogeneity Impacts of Farmers’ Participation in Payment for Ecosystem Services Based on the Collective Action Framework

Payments for Watershed Ecosystem Services in the Eyes of the Public, China

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Inter-provincial Diversified Ecological Compensation Collaborative Governance

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