From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account

Abstract

Belief polarization (BP) is widely seen to threaten havoc on our shared political lives. It is often assumed that BP is the product of epistemically irrational behaviors at the individual level. After distinguishing between BP as it occurs in intra-group and inter-group settings, this paper argues that neither process necessarily reflects individual epistemic irrationality. It is true that these processes can work in tandem to produce so-called “echo chambers.” But while echo chambers are often problematic from the point of view of collective rationality, it doesn't follow that individuals are doing anything wrong, epistemically speaking, in seeking them out. In non-ideal socio-epistemic contexts, echo chamber construction might provide one's best defense against systematic misinformation and deception.

There's a certain slant of light: Three attitudes toward the political turn in analytic philosophy

“…For instance, they argue that the claim “The lack of cognitive sophistication makes us more open and gullible” is evolutionarily unsustainable (see Mercier 2020, 30–46), and that polarization stems from being exposed to too many good (enough) justifications for our initial views, which leads us to develop stronger positions. In fact, the work arguing that polarization is perfectly rational has been increasing in the past few years (Almagro 2023; Begby 2022; Benoit and Dubra 2016; Dorst forthcoming; Jern, Chang, and Kemp 2014; Kelly 2008; Nielsen and Stewart 2021; Pallavincini, Hallsson, and Kappel 2021; Singer et al 2019).…”

The Myth of the Good Epistemic Bubble

“…A final objection to my account is that epistemic bubbles, and hence echo chambers, can at times be the collective result of behaviors that lead to belief polarization but are nevertheless rational at the individual level. In this way, the argument goes, it may be rational under certain non-ideal conditions for individuals to stay put in epistemic bubbles (Begby 2022). One might extend this line of thought to suggest that the particular sense in which I have shown that all epistemic bubbles are inherently epistemically problematic p does not apply in our social context.…”

“…The best case in support of this line of thought is that one should “be more inclined” to designate as one's epistemic peers precisely those “who tend to share [one's] judgment on what [one] take[s] to be issues of importance,” while one should be less inclined to designate as one's epistemic peers those who do not tend to share one's judgments on those particular issues (Begby 2022: 9). Then, assuming that one does as one purportedly ought to do in designating one's epistemic peers, one should become more confident in the judgments one shares with their epistemic peer group on the basis of one's agreement concerning important issues with one's epistemic peers.…”

“…And one should become less confident in the opposing views supported by those who are not one's peers on the basis of one's disagreement on those issues with individuals who are not one's designated epistemic peers. When many individuals designate their epistemic peers in this manner, which then leads to an increase in confidence in their own judgments, epistemic bubbles arise out of individuals behaving rationally (Begby 2022: 1–12).…”

Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs

“…What one might call the epistemic exonorationists have recently sought to defend people with bad beliefs from allegations of epistemic irrationality. Exonorationists aim to show that the belief-formation of agents with bad beliefs is largely sensible and thus not deserving of blame (e.g., Rini, 2017 ; Levy, 2021 ; Meylan and Schmidt, 2023 ; Begby, 2022 ; see also Bortolotti, 2022 ). What follows will agree with them to a considerable degree: I argue that primarily groups —rather than individuals—should be blamed for the bad social epistemic norms within them.…”