Friedman’s Relativised<i>A Priori</i>and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility

Ivanova, Milena

doi:10.1080/02698595.2011.552416

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

2011

DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2011.552416

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Friedman’s RelativisedA Prioriand Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility

Milena Ivanova¹

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Cited by 2 publications

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“…That is why there is no tension, whatsoever, between the fact that the applied logical and mathematical structures as well as the constructed semantics can change (see point 17) when a theory is superseded by another one, on the one hand, and their constitutive role in furnishing reality, on the other (cf. Friedman 2001;MacArthur 2008;Ivanova 2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and the Constitutive A Priori

Szabó

2019

Found Phys

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On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian-Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a "thing-in-itself"; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsicextrinsic distinction is flawed.

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confidence: 99%

Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and the Constitutive A Priori

Szabó

2019

Found Phys

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Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument?

Mizrahi¹

2015

Social Epistemology

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Abstract:In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn's incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn's incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn's incommensurability thesis, since there are rebutting defeaters against it in the form of episodes from the history of science that do not exhibit discontinuity and replacement, as Kuhn's incommensurability thesis predicts, but rather continuity and supplementation. If this is correct, then there are no compelling epistemic reasons to believe that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is true or probable.

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Friedman’s RelativisedA Prioriand Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility

Cited by 2 publications

References 10 publications

Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and the Constitutive A Priori

Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and the Constitutive A Priori

Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument?

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