Freedom as Non-Domination, Normativity, and Indeterminacy

2009

Res Publica

One of the central elements of John Rawls' argument in support of his two principles of justice is the intuitive normative ideal of citizens as free and equal. But taken in isolation, the claim that citizens are to be treated as free and equal is extremely indeterminate, and has virtually no clear implications for policy. In order to remedy this, the two principles of justice, together with the stipulation that citizens have basic interests in developing their moral capacities and pursuing their conceptions of the good life, are meant to provide a more precise interpretation of what is involved in treating citizens as free and equal. Rawls' critics, however, have argued that satisfying the two principles of justice is not the most appropriate or plausible way to respect the status of citizens as free and equal. In relation to this debate, the present paper has two aims. The first is to examine Rawls' account of the type of freedom that a just society must guarantee equally to its citizens. I will argue that those who think of Rawls as a theorist of freedom as non-interference are mistaken, because his notion of liberty resembles in important respects the republican notion of freedom as non-domination. Second, I will consider the extent to which Rawls' principles of justice successfully protect the freedom as non-domination of all citizens so as to effectively treat them as free and equal.

Section: Justice As Fairness and The Prevention Of Dominationmentioning

confidence: 97%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Rawls on Liberty and Domination

2009

Res Publica

“…Pettit uses the word “interference” as a label for this sort of behavior, but I think this makes it harder to get a clear view of what really unifies instances of it. Rather, a more illuminating way to explain the relevant class of action appeals to the notion of prima facie wrongness (Costa ). The notion of prima facie wrongness can be explained by reference to the idea of commonsense morality as a system of prohibitions (for example, do not kill, cause pain, or deceive) and limited requirements (for example, keep your promises).…”

Section: Interference and Prima Facie Wrongnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Freedom as Non‐Domination and Widespread Prejudice

2019

Metaphilosophy

Self Cite

This paper offers an answer to an objection to Phillip Pettit's neo-republican account of freedom as non-domination raised by Sharon Krause. The objection is that widespread prejudice, such as systemic racism or sexism, generates significant obstacles to individuals' free agency but that neo-republicanism fails to explain why these obstacles reduce freedom. This is because neo-republicanism defines domination in terms of the capacity for arbitrary interference, but many prejudiced actions do not involve physical coercion, threats, or any other behavior typically described as types of interference. The paper discusses three strategies to account for the impact of widespread prejudice on the domination of groups. It argues that the most plausible strategy redefines domination in terms of behavior that is prima facie wrong and lacks appropriate checks. Such behavior includes interference but also includes prejudiced actions, such as failing to select the most qualified candidate for a job.

“…7 But in fact, there is nothing in neo-republican philosophy that militates against giving moral rights a basic justificatory role. 8 Indeed, it turns out that this is a very promising strategy for neo-republicans to adopt when building their theories if -as I have argued elsewhere -one cannot give an informative account of freedom as non-domination without appealing to at least some more basic normative terms (Costa 2007(Costa , 2019.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Neo-republicanism’s Methodological Commitments and Individual Rights

2022

Theoria

This article considers why the influential neo-republicans Philip Pettit and Richard Bellamy tend to minimise or deny the role that natural or moral rights play in republican thought. It argues that their specific views about the theoretical role of such rights are motivated by methodological commitments. In Pettit’s case the commitments are to consequentialism and formalism, while in Bellamy’s it is to proceduralism. But these commitments get in the way of providing a fully adequate account of the value of freedom as non-domination: one that allows us to determine when citizens actually enjoy this kind of freedom. Finally, the article argues that a full explanation of what it means to enjoy freedom as non-domination must unavoidably appeal to normative notions.