Neo-republicanism’s Methodological Commitments and Individual Rights

Abstract

This article considers why the influential neo-republicans Philip Pettit and Richard Bellamy tend to minimise or deny the role that natural or moral rights play in republican thought. It argues that their specific views about the theoretical role of such rights are motivated by methodological commitments. In Pettit’s case the commitments are to consequentialism and formalism, while in Bellamy’s it is to proceduralism. But these commitments get in the way of providing a fully adequate account of the value of freedom as non-domination: one that allows us to determine when citizens actually enjoy this kind of freedom. Finally, the article argues that a full explanation of what it means to enjoy freedom as non-domination must unavoidably appeal to normative notions.

The Kantian Republic

“…Neo-republicanism, for instance, has been criticized for downplaying the role of rights (Hamel 2017;Laborde and Maynor 2008, 15-20;Victoria Costa 2022). Instead, Pettit uses the interests of 127 the citizen in order to explain domination as an arbitrary intervention of the citizens' interests.…”