Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency

Nida‐Rümelin, Martine

doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9872-0

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 8 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In a later paper, Nida‐Rümelin () backs away from the claim that in experiencing ourselves or others as active in behavior, we experience the behavior as caused by the agents in question, although she nevertheless maintains that we experience it as brought about by the agents.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Clarke

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Several philosophers claim that the phenomenology of one's own agency conflicts with standard causal theories of action, couched in terms of causation by mental events or states. Others say that the phenomenology is prima facie incompatible with such a theory, even if in the end, a reconciliation can be worked out. Here, it is argued that the type of action theory in question is consistent with what can plausibly be said to be presented to us in our experience of our agency. Several routes to a claim that there is nevertheless a prima facie incompatibility are examined, and all are found wanting. The phenomenology of agency, it is argued, is no threat to a standard causal theory of action.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Clarke

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Gründe und Ursachen – eine erneute Betrachtung

Beckermann

2021

ZusammenDenken

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems

Tomczyk

2023

J Gen Philos Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The increasing popularity of artificial cognitive enhancements raises the issue of their impact on the agent’s personal autonomy, and issues pertaining to how the latter is to be secured. The extended mind thesis implies that mental states responsible for autonomous action can be partly constituted by the workings of cognitive artifacts themselves, and the question then arises of whether this commits one to embracing an extended agent thesis. My answer is negative. After briefly presenting the main accounts on the conditions for autonomous agency, and analyzing how the latter can be protected from threats posed by the use of cognitive artifacts, I argue that autonomous agency is essentially tied to conscious experience and intentionality, which in turn can only be attributed to the human part of any extended cognitive system. I present both theoretical (conceptual) and practical arguments against recognizing the entire extended system, composed of one human and an artifact, as an autonomous agent.

show abstract

Freedom and the Phenomenology of Agency

Cited by 6 publications

References 8 publications

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Gründe und Ursachen – eine erneute Betrachtung

The Locus of Agency in Extended Cognitive Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About