Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Clarke, Randolph

doi:10.1111/papq.12275

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Some appeal to the idea that physical states realize mental states. The defender of ECR may appeal to the idea that agent‐causation (in Chisholm's sense) is realized by specific event‐causal sequences (Bishop, 1989, p. 96; Clarke 2019a, 2019b). I count that view as reductive with respect to action.…”

Section: The Agent‐mind Problem and Event‐causal Reductionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

Wallace

2023

Philosophical Issues

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The standard event‐causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event‐causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the “agent‐mind problem”, the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event‐causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event‐causal answers to the agent‐mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event‐casual view. The paper concludes with a burden‐shifting argument against emergentist agent‐causal theories and non‐reductive event‐causal theories of agency.

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Section: The Agent‐mind Problem and Event‐causal Reductionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It assumes an implausibly high standard for successful reduction. As Bishop (1989, p. 96) and Clarke (2019b, pp. 752–753) suggest, it could be that although agent‐causation is conceptually fundamental, it is ontologically non‐fundamental such that there is no a priori route and yet ECR is true.…”

Section: A Challenge That Fundamentally Mattersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

Wallace

2023

Philosophical Issues

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The Disappearing Agent and the Phenomenology of Agency

2024

Erkenn

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The causal theory of action is thought to be plagued by the problem of the disappearing agent. However, philosophers have reached no consensus on the nature of this problem, let alone on whether it is solvable. In this article, I interpret the problem as a phenomenological challenge: the causal theory of action employs an event-causal framework, with which certain aspects of the phenomenology of agency seem incompatible. I examine two areas in which the phenomenology appears to speak against an event-causal framework: (1) the phenomenology of acting and (2) the phenomenology of making choices. Specifically, some philosophers have asserted that the phenomenology of acting involves content that action is caused by the agent themselves rather than by their mental states. Some philosophers have argued that the phenomenology of making choices involves content that the agent stands apart from their mental states in a way that allows them to reflect on, evaluate, or even manipulate their mental states. I argue that in neither case does the phenomenology pose a real challenge to the causal theory of action.

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Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency

Cited by 2 publications

References 36 publications

Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

The Disappearing Agent and the Phenomenology of Agency

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