Free Traders and Drug Smugglers: The Effects of Trade Openness on States' Ability to Combat Drug Trafficking

Abstract

The theoretical literature presents conflicting expectations about the effects of trade openness on the ability of states to interdict drug trafficking. One view expects that trade openness will undermine drug interdiction; a second argues the opposite; a third argues that trade openness does not necessarily affect drug interdiction. This article assesses empirically the effects of trade openness on drug interdiction for countries in the Americas using a pooled time-series cross-sectional statistical model. It finds that trade openness decreases the interdiction capabilities of states in drug-consuming countries while increasing those of states in drug-producing countries. Greater openness to trade does not have a consistently significant effect on the interdiction capabilities of states in drug transit countries.

Playing Pac-Man in Portville: Policing the dilution and fragmentation of drug importations through major seaports

“…Increasing securitization of ports is unlikely to have effects on the drug markets beyond those of displacement, as already advanced by critiques of the application of situational crime prevention techniques for organized crime disruption (Von Lampe, 2011). The growing mobility of goods, which brings into question the neo-liberal turn of cultures of capital (Bartilow and Eom, 2009), the clear push towards free trade and the subservient politics of transnational governance and security to the needs of consumerism (Eski, 2019) are drivers of the drugs market; as such they need to be addressed further in assessing the effects of securitization of policing of ports in the fight against the trafficking and importation of drugs. Eventually, the rules of trade and the need to obey the neo-liberal turn of cultures of capital are what affect the success of drug importation the most, and not the failures of security.…”

“…A border is considered secure if drugs cannot get through or are confiscated when they arrive. However, free trade might both undermine as well as enhance the drug interdiction capabilities of a state (Bartilow and Eom, 2009). Indeed, a security paradox has emerged in the realm of serious criminality (Di Ronco and Sergi, 2019).…”

Poor institutions as a comparative advantage

“…I include it as a control for geographical and physical features that suit drug trafficking. The more coastline a country has, the more options a cartel has for landing and departure points for illicit cargo, making detection less likely (Bartilow and Eom 2009). …”

“…Openness to trade relates to illicit drug trafficking in several potential ways. Bartilow and Eom (2009) analyze whether trade openness enhances or undermines drug interdiction. They postulate that trade openness can reduce drug interdiction because a large volume of trade provides opportunities for smuggling drugs in and out of the country and reduces the likelihood of detection.…”

Crime organisé et violences en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes

“…Il convient de mentionner l'importance de la transformation des États, sous l'effet de la mondialisation. Bartilow et K. Eom 27 proposent que l'ouverture économique et le libre-échange ont diminué les capacités des États consommateurs mais ont augmenté celles des producteurs, puisque les incitations à investir dans les secteurs autres que l'économie illicite sont désormais plus importantes. Le rôle des forces de sécurité en charge du problème mérite un chapitre à part.…”