2016
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1244751
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France’s reluctant parliamentarisation of military deployments: the 2008 constitutional reform in practice

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Cited by 28 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…The German Bundestag has ex ante approval rights for military missions due to a Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 and has voted more than 140 times since, partly because extensions, changes in mandate or troop levels require parliamentary approval. The French parliament was only endowed with ex post voting rights on military operations through the constitutional reform of 2008 (Ostermann, 2017). In Spain, parliamentary control of military missions had become an issue in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo intervention, but it was only after the highly contested involvement of Spain in the 2003 Iraq war that an ex ante veto power was introduced, by means of an Organic Law, in 2005.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The German Bundestag has ex ante approval rights for military missions due to a Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1994 and has voted more than 140 times since, partly because extensions, changes in mandate or troop levels require parliamentary approval. The French parliament was only endowed with ex post voting rights on military operations through the constitutional reform of 2008 (Ostermann, 2017). In Spain, parliamentary control of military missions had become an issue in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo intervention, but it was only after the highly contested involvement of Spain in the 2003 Iraq war that an ex ante veto power was introduced, by means of an Organic Law, in 2005.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many transition countries—including Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania—initially established firm parliamentary rights in security matters, only to curb these regulations during their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession processes in the early 2000s (Cottey et al, 2002; Wagner et al, 2010). All of this led also to increasing research interest in the role that parliaments play when governments send troops abroad, and in democratic security policy more generally (Dieterich et al, 2015; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Ostermann, 2017; Peters and Wagner, 2011; Strong, 2015b).…”
Section: Current Research and Its Focus On Formal Legislative–executimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This was the case for the deployment votes in Italy and for the votes in the UK's House of Commons on Iraq, Libya, and Syria (Mello, 2017;Coticchia and Vignoli, 2018;Strong, 2018). A score of 0 was assigned to deployment votes in France, where voting on military deployment is only required after 4 months, and to Belgium's parliamentary vote on the French-led operation Serval, which was an ex post legitimatization of a government's decision without parliament having an actual impact on the decision (Ostermann, 2017;Reykers and Fonck, 2018: 690).…”
Section: Divisiveness Deployment Decision and Parliamentary Involvementmentioning
confidence: 99%