The Cambridge History of the Cold War 2010
DOI: 10.1017/chol9780521837200.009
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

France, “Gaullism,” and the Cold War

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

0
2
0
1

Year Published

2012
2012
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 10 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 1 publication
0
2
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…He perceived the hegemonic power of the United States to be particularly threatening and argued that France needed strong, assertive statesmanship to restore its prestige and reassert its independence. The situation in Vietnam provided him with an excellent opportunity to show that France would not submit to American expectations (Bozo 2010).…”
Section: The Genesis Of Gaullist Foreign Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…He perceived the hegemonic power of the United States to be particularly threatening and argued that France needed strong, assertive statesmanship to restore its prestige and reassert its independence. The situation in Vietnam provided him with an excellent opportunity to show that France would not submit to American expectations (Bozo 2010).…”
Section: The Genesis Of Gaullist Foreign Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Para Bozzo, muitos dos pressupostos do plano Fouche se assemelhavam à perspectiva defendida por George F. Kennan, então já distante do centro da elaboração política externa dos EUA 18 . Ao longo dos próximos anos, apesar do seu anticomunismo e das pesadas críticas que De Gaulle havia feito quando estava na oposição, responsabilizando a URSS e os comunistas pela Guerra Fria, o presidente francês manteve uma agenda bastante dinâmica com vistas a melhorar as relações com a URSS e com os países do Leste 19 .…”
Section: A Détente Francesaunclassified
“…This is evidenced by the widespread French fears at this time about a British and American conspiracy against the French empire in Africa and the Middle East . Events at Suez in 1956 compounded the divide between France and ‘les Anglo‐Saxons’, with Britain prioritizing its relationship with the United States, while France, convinced that the U.K. and the U.S. were to blame for its humiliation at Suez and resentful of the Anglo‐American rapprochement, increasingly pursued a foreign policy independent of the ‘Anglo‐Saxon’ powers . In the African context, this approach informed French policy towards the former Belgian Congo in the nineteen‐sixties, the Nigerian civil war (1967–70), and the Rwandan genocide of 1994, where France stood on the opposing side to Britain and the U.S.A.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%