This article asks whether the willingness of partisans to condone democratic backsliding is a uniquely American phenomenon and explores why partisans would tolerate a party leader subverting democratic norms. We focus on executive aggrandizement as a key mechanism through which democratic backsliding occurs and develop three potential explanations for why partisans would accept the weakening of checks on the power of the executive. First, in a context of affective polarization, partisans may condone executive aggrandizement in order to advantage their party and disadvantage the opponent. Second, partisans may be willing to trade off democratic norms in pursuit of their ideological agenda. Third, partisans may take cues from the behaviour of party elites. These explanations are tested using a candidate-choice conjoint experiment administered to Americans and Canadians in 2019 that involved respondents choosing between hypothetical candidates in intra-party contests. Regardless of party, partisans in both countries proved willing to choose candidates who would loosen legislative and judicial restraints on the executive. While the partisan advantage explanation only held for strong Republicans in the United States, partisans in Canada and the United States alike were apparently willing to weaken restraints on the executive for the sake of their ideological agendas, at least in the case of abortion. Finally, Republicans who approved of the Trump presidency were much less likely than other Republicans to punish undemocratic candidates, lending support to the cue-taking explanation.

The COVID-19 pandemic offers a critical opportunity to assess the extent to which Canadians can be considered reliable defenders of democratic norms and institutions. In the face of such a serious threat to their physical and economic well-being, how willing are Canadians to condone the loosening of restraints on the power of the executive? This article addresses this question by drawing on the terror management and threat literatures. Combining a cross-sectional regression analysis with a vignette experiment and a candidate-choice conjoint experiment, it tests two hypotheses: that people experiencing debilitating anxiety about COVID-19 are more likely to favour weakening checks on the executive and that people will be willing to trade off legislative checks for the sake of their preferred lockdown policy. Both hypotheses are confirmed. In the face of an unprecedented health crisis, COVID-related anxiety and a desire for protective policies may trump respect for democratic norms.

The long and stable Franco-American diplomatic rapport was undermined throughout the American escalation of the Vietnam War. This paper specifically examines French President Charles de Gaulle’s increasing discontent at his ally’s involvement in Southeast Asia and analyzes the decisions of successive American presidents to ignore him. Beginning in 1961, with the inauguration of American President John F. Kennedy, the paper proceeds chronologically to 1964, by which point transatlantic relations had worsened considerably as a result of de Gaulle’s growing confrontation of the Indochina question. Using archival diplomatic documents from both countries, this paper seeks to explain why the United States government refused to comply with De Gaulle’s requests. This papers makes two main conclusions: American policy makers were willfully blind to their ally’s suggestions and the French proposal for the neutralization of Vietnam was not realistic. These findings are supported by various policy decisions made leading up to the war, relying heavily on primary sources to demonstrate the failings of both the French proposal and the American willingness to consider the perspective of a crucial ally.