2001
DOI: 10.1080/09592290108406225
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France and the Cold War, 1944–63

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The problem Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 09: 31 22 June 2016 with focusing first on institutional reform is that it amplified the existential debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Rather than focus on what united the member states, De Gaulle's proposal exposed the huge gulf dividing them (see ludlow 1997; Soutou 2001). The differences in their international positions and their varying degrees of support for supranationalism, intergovernmentalism and UK membership proved too complicated to overcome.…”
Section: Political Integration and Summitry 1961mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The problem Downloaded by [University of Sussex Library] at 09: 31 22 June 2016 with focusing first on institutional reform is that it amplified the existential debate between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Rather than focus on what united the member states, De Gaulle's proposal exposed the huge gulf dividing them (see ludlow 1997; Soutou 2001). The differences in their international positions and their varying degrees of support for supranationalism, intergovernmentalism and UK membership proved too complicated to overcome.…”
Section: Political Integration and Summitry 1961mentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Despite its traditional Gaullist foreign policy discourse, France has since 1945 relied on the American alliance for security (Schmitt 2017;Talmor and Selden 2017;Trachtenberg 2012). The American presence in Europe benefited France by keeping Soviet-Russian power at bay and ensuring that Germany remained benign (Creswell 2002;Soutou 2001). Although Berlin lacks actual military power, its large population, economy, and advanced industrial base offer the foundation for a potentially formidable military force.…”
Section: Preventing Chinese Hegemonymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…135 Moreover, since de Gaulle believed the nation to be the 'permanent unit in international affairs', 136 he regarded Soviet communism as somewhat ephemeral, with a return to "traditional Russian foreign policy" being the most likely scenario in the future. 137 These agreements were followed up in December of that year with Alexei Kosygin's visit to Paris, which occasioned de Gaulle to emphasise publicly the importance of power. 163 Thus, for different reasons, opponents of containment could be found on the fringes of both parties in the early decades of the Cold War.…”
Section: Moving To the Right 1951-57mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…traditional conservative force in French politics.58 Gaullism combined domestic nationalism with an international worldview based on notions of 19 th century realpolitik that sought to promote French interests in a dangerous world of fickle nation states and multiple challenges to the country's independence.59 DeGaulle believed it was the nation, not the individual, which comprised the principal French strategy in the early Cold War period was determined largely by shifts in the balance of forces within the government during the period and the changing ideological bases of strategy that resulted, as prime ministers adjusted their conduct foreign affairs to suit the conditions of possibility established by successive French strategy was neutral between Washington and Moscow, since the four PCF ministers in the government would not countenance anything62 The position of prime minister was officially styled as the 'President of the Council of Ministers' until the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958, but the post mirrors the competences held by prime ministers in other parliamentary systems. an anti-Soviet alliance 67. The clauses of the Treaty of Dunkirk, signed with Britain on 4 March 1946, aimed formally at preventing only Germannot Sovietaggression, although these were 'cosmetic' clauses in many respects, since it was clear both countries had the Soviets as much as the Germans in mind when drafting the treaty 68.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%