The purpose of this article is to understand the EU/UK security relationship after Brexit and the institutional form(s) it may take. Taking stock of the literature on the consequences of Brexit for European foreign affairs, this article employs a question-driven approach to examine uncertainties regarding the future EU/UK security relationship. These questions relate in particular to the United Kingdom’s commitment to European security after Brexit, the nature of post-Brexit developments within the Union, and the European Union’s willingness to afford the United Kingdom a substantial role after withdrawal. This article examines each of these questions in turn, before considering the viability of three frequently mooted institutional arrangements post-Brexit: UK participation in the CSDP as a third country; increased engagement with NATO that becomes the main platform for cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Union; and the enhancement of bilateral ties between the United Kingdom and key European allies – especially France.

Though the UK is weaker than the EU on key metrics of bargaining power, the British approach to the first phase of the Brexit negotiations has been characterized by hard bargaining. Efforts to explain this puzzle have focused on constraints at the domestic level, but have not engaged with the cultural sources of bargaining style highlighted by constructivist scholars. Drawing on a series of interviews, this article suggests a number of cultural factors have influenced the UK's decision to adopt a hard bargaining strategy, including the country's majoritarian institutional culture, its weak socialization into the EU, overstated perceptions of its own capabilities, the prevailing conservative political ideology, and a longstanding preference for 'divide and rule' diplomatic strategies. Our findings suggest not only that the UK's choice of negotiating strategy is sub-optimal but also that theories of bargaining need to pay attention to cultural factors predisposing actors to particular strategies.

Research on the Brexit negotiations has linked the problems faced by Britain to flawed assumptions in the UK's perception of EU interests. These include the ideas that the EU would be open to compromise on key principles, that it would offer the UK a bespoke relationship, that national capitals would respond favourably to bilateral initiatives, and that EU unity would not hold. Yet the origins of these assumptions have been subject to little systematic scrutiny. How did such wrong-headed assumptions about the EU's interests emerge? Drawing on insights from bounded rationality we identify three aspects of the decision-making environment linked with biased thinking: (1) ill-fitting routines and lessons, (2) a lack of decision-making openness, and (3) a lack of EU expertise and contact. We demonstrate our argument using data obtained from interviews in Brussels and London in 2017-18 and accounts of those involved in the decisions.

Research on political parties and foreign policy has grown in recent years in response to disciplinary and real-world changes. But party research still bears the imprint of earlier scepticism about the role of parties. The result is scholarship which is disaggregated, which avoids difficult cases for parties, and which has focused more on showing that parties matter relative to structural accounts of foreign policy-making. This article takes stock of recent research on political parties, party politics and their role in foreign policy-making. We argue that it is time for party research not only to embrace the question of whether parties matter but also how, when and where they matter. This requires a move away from most-likely cases and the realist foil towards an embrace of the complexity of party positions. Building on International Relations, comparative politics and foreign policy analysis scholarship, we suggest four avenues deserving of greater scholarly focus: 1) ideological multidimensionality; 2) parties as organizations and the role of entrepreneurs; 3) parties as transnational foreign policy actors; and 4) the interaction between parties and the changing global order. We propose how these literatures can help identify new research questions, contribute to theory development and help define scope conditions. This will hopefully help scholars establish benchmarks for judging the efficacy of parties in foreign policy-making.

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