Framework for Evaluating the Severity of Cybervulnerability of a Traffic Cabinet

Ernst, Joseph M.; Michaels, Alan J.

doi:10.3141/2619-06

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…The results also demonstrate that the co-simulation approach is very useful for evaluating the physical impacts of real cyber attacks. Moreover, unlike the work by Ernst and Michaels [5], no assumptions had to be made about the effects of cyber attacks on the traffic light control components.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…road corridor used by Ernst and Michaels [5]. The experimental setup shown in Figure 8 comprised six coordinated signalized intersections, each spaced 100 m apart.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ernst and Michaels [5] have presented a threat assessment framework that evaluates the impacts of vulnerabilities that provide access to field devices in a traffic control system. Their framework considers four access levels whose security flaws may be exploited: (i) vehicle detector; (ii) corridor synchronization; (iii) traditional Internet; and (iv) physical access.…”

Section: Traffic Control System Threat Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Cyber-Physical Testbed for Measuring the Impacts of Cyber Attacks on Urban Road Networks

Urdaneta

Lemay

Saunier

et al. 2018

Critical Infrastructure Protection XII

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Efficient and safe transportation of people and goods are key requirements in a modern economy. Traffic control systems are installed at complex intersections to ensure the safe and efficient flow of traffic. However, there are concerns that an adversary could launch cyber attacks that exploit flaws in traffic control systems to cause mayhem and accidents. This chapter presents a co-simulation framework for cyber-physical systems that enables researchers to execute cyber attacks on traffic control systems and measure their impacts on road traffic. The approach integrates an emulated supervisory control and data acquisition master station with a microscopic traffic simulation tool that provides all the functions of a traffic signal control system. The impacts of cyber attacks on road traffic are measured from the outputs provided by the traffic simulation. Experimental results for a corridor of six coordinated signalized intersections are presented, where the impacts are measured in terms of vehicle travel time and queue length. The results reveal that the physical impacts of compromising a single intersection could be felt at other intersections in the road network. This type of emergent result could only have been observed using a co-simulation framework.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…road corridor used by Ernst and Michaels [5]. The experimental setup shown in Figure 8 comprised six coordinated signalized intersections, each spaced 100 m apart.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Traffic Control System Threat Assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Cyber-Physical Testbed for Measuring the Impacts of Cyber Attacks on Urban Road Networks

Urdaneta

Lemay

Saunier

et al. 2018

Critical Infrastructure Protection XII

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“…There are studies demonstrating attacks that can realize non-existent jams and virtual vehicles, tamper with signal schedules [46], [47], [48], [49]. Considering the impact of successful attacks, it is imperative to systematically understand the existence of vulnerabilities, and design security frameworks to protect traffic infrastructure against such malicious attacks [50], [51].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Synergistic Security for the Industrial Internet of Things: Integrating Redundancy, Diversity, and Hardening

Lászka¹,

Abbas²,

Vorobeychik³

et al. 2018

2018 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Internet (ICII)

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As the Industrial Internet of Things (IIot) becomes more prevalent in critical application domains, ensuring security and resilience in the face of cyber-attacks is becoming an issue of paramount importance. Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures, for example, against smart water-distribution and transportation systems, pose serious threats to public health and safety. Owing to the severity of these threats, a variety of security techniques are available. However, no single technique can address the whole spectrum of cyber-attacks that may be launched by a determined and resourceful attacker. In light of this, we consider a multi-pronged approach for designing secure and resilient IIoT systems, which integrates redundancy, diversity, and hardening techniques. We introduce a framework for quantifying cyber-security risks and optimizing IIoT design by determining security investments in redundancy, diversity, and hardening. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we present two case studies in water distribution and transportation systems. Our numerical evaluation shows that integrating redundancy, diversity, and hardening can lead to reduced security risk at the same cost.

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“…Existing research efforts on vehicular communications discuss possible attacks and their mitigation methods ( 5 , 8 ). A recent study on current signal cabinets presents the idea that the possible impact of attacks could be unmanageable queues ( 13 ). Overall, ITS applications require protocols that conflict with anonymity and privacy requirements.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling Cyber Attacks at Intelligent Traffic Signals

Comert

Pollard

Nicol

et al. 2018

Transportation Research Record

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Transportation networks are considered one of the critical physical infrastructures for resilient cities (cyber-physical systems). In efforts to minimize adverse effects that come with the advancement of vehicular technologies, various governmental agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), work together. This paper develops belief-network-based attack modeling at signalized traffic networks under connected vehicle and intelligent signals frameworks. For different types of cyber attacks, defined in the literature, risk areas and impacts of attacks are evaluated. Vulnerability scores, technically based on the selected metrics, are calculated for signal controllers. In addition, the effect of having redundant traffic sensing systems on intersection performance measures is demonstrated in terms of average queue length differences.Resilience of critical infrastructures is defined as their ability to withstand an upsetting event, deliver essential levels of service during it, and recover quickly after it. With the increase of connected systems, cyber attacks that can target critical infrastructure systems are becoming more troubling. Transportation networks are considered one of the critical physical infrastructures for resilient cities (cyber-physical systems [CPSs] [1]). According to recent reports (2-4), several benefits are foreseen from upcoming technologies such as connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), including up to 80% reduction in fatalities from multi-vehicle crashes and prevention of the majority of human-error-related incidents, which takes out about 94% of all incidents. These intelligent applications, however, come at a price; for example, in 2015 alone 1.5 million vehicles were recalled because of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. NHTSA's current research focuses on CAVs that are heavily involved in secure implementations which will enable the field and its technology experts to harness efficient, reliable, and secure system design (3). Some of these topics can be listed as anomaly-based intrusion detection systems, cybersecurity of firmware updates, cybersecurity on heavy vehicles, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication interfaces, and trusted vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications (5). The main goals for any critical infrastructure are quick detection of attacks and rapid mitigation efforts (6). There are many attack types, of which some can be resolved via detection and some require redundant systems and sensors. In intelligent transportation systems (ITS), to increase security and resiliency in case of possible attacks or benign system errors during different events, research is likewise needed into detection using various sensors and data types. Research is also necessary to enhance confidence in sensor readings by checking consistency with other sensors and information sources as well as validating control system commands (7). This paper investigates attack modeling and impacts on intelligent signals. For differe...

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Framework for Evaluating the Severity of Cybervulnerability of a Traffic Cabinet

Cited by 13 publications

References 11 publications

A Cyber-Physical Testbed for Measuring the Impacts of Cyber Attacks on Urban Road Networks

A Cyber-Physical Testbed for Measuring the Impacts of Cyber Attacks on Urban Road Networks

Synergistic Security for the Industrial Internet of Things: Integrating Redundancy, Diversity, and Hardening

Modeling Cyber Attacks at Intelligent Traffic Signals

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