Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002

Figueroa, Julio. Ríos

doi:10.1353/lap.2007.0011

Cited by 53 publications

(43 citation statements)

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“…The emergence of judicial power is even clearer in democratizing contexts. For example, in different works, Magaloni (2003) and Ríos‐Figueroa (2007), respectively, explain that the fragmentation of the political arena facilitated the emergence of an independent judiciary in Mexico's PRI regime, allowing for the development of an incrementally powerful judiciary throughout the protracted transition to democracy. On the other hand, Moustafa (2003, 2007), analyzing the Constitutional Court of Egypt, shows that, in the Arab world, liberal judges were able to challenge Mubarak's authoritarian regime in a variety of politically prominent issue areas, due to, among other reasons, the ruler's need to rely on independent judges to assure international investors and the private sector that the court would deter potential changes to the free market economy; and, in connection with the judges' liberal stance, a support structure for litigation (or “legal complex”) evolved, which seized the opportunity to challenge the regime in non‐sensitive areas and make gradual progress, until late challenges by the court enraged the regime, and rulers responded by tackling the courts' activism.…”

Section: Courts In Hybrid Regimes Emerging From Democratic Settings: mentioning

confidence: 99%

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

Urribarri¹

2011

Law soc. inq.

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This article offers a theoretical discussion about courts in “hybrid regimes” that evolve from formerly democratic countries. The evolution toward authoritarianism typically allows governments more latitude to reduce judicial independence and judicial power. Yet, several reasons, including legitimacy costs, a tradition of using courts for judicial adjudication and social control, and even the use of courts for quenching dissent may discourage rulers from shutting down the judicial contestation arena and encourage them instead to appeal to less overbearing measures. This usually leads to a decline of the judiciary's proclivity to challenge the government, especially in salient cases. To illustrate these dynamics, I discuss the rise and fall of judicial power in Venezuela under Chávez's rule, focusing on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. Formerly the most powerful institution in the country's history, the Chamber briefly emerged as an influential actor at the beginning of the regime, but a comprehensive intervention of the judiciary in 2004 further politicized the court and effectively reduced its policy‐making role.

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Section: Courts In Hybrid Regimes Emerging From Democratic Settings: mentioning

confidence: 99%

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

Urribarri¹

2011

Law soc. inq.

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“…In his early study of judicial politics in Latin America, Verner (1984, 464) indicated that the institutional stability of many high courts in the region is compromised by the divergence between constitutional guarantees and what happens in reality. Similarly, although all Latin American countries are tripartite separation of powers systems, many authors have found that where presidents or legislators accrue sufficient political power, they exploit this power to change the composition of the courts (Chávez 2004, 452‐3; Helmke 2005, 28; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002, 703; Ríos‐Figueroa 2007, 33; Scribner 2004, 23‐6). This behavior by political actors concerns the need to have judges who support their political projects 1…”

Section: Institutional Changes In Latin America's Courtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Power and the Judicialization of Politics as Determinants of Institutional Change in the Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Ecuador (1979‐2009)

Basabe‐Serrano¹

2012

Politics & Policy

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What explains institutional instability in national judicial institutions? Much extant research focuses on de facto institutional instability, emphasizing political motivations behind irregular changes to high court composition. In contrast, I consider the causes for de jure changes made to the Ecuadorian Supreme Court from 1979 to the present, drawing on qualitative and quantitative analyses. I contend that the judicialization of politics and presidential interest in stacking the courts are central explanatory factors, and that changes to the Supreme Court's institutional framework reflect implicit compromises and political arrangements negotiated by strategic political actors. As such, institutional reforms to national judicial institutions may be adopted to ameliorate conflict in the larger political sphere. Related Articles:“Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Consolidation of Democracy.” (2009) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2008.00159.x/abstract “Political and Economic Liberty in Latin America: Can They Coexist?” (2004) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2004.tb00179.x/abstract “The Impact of Divided Government on the Supreme Court Appointment Process.” (2011) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00325.x/abstract ¿Qué factores explican la inestabilidad institucional en los Poderes Judiciales nacionales? Al respecto, la mayoría de investigaciones focalizan en la inestabilidad institucional de facto, enfatizando en las motivaciones políticas que llevan a cambios en la composición de las cortes. En contraste, y recurriendo a un análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo, este artículo analiza las causas de los cambios de jure realizados en la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Ecuador desde 1979 hasta la fecha. El artículo propone que la judicialización de la política y el interés de los presidentes por controlar las cortes son los factores clave que explican tales cambios institucionales y que dichas variaciones en la Corte Suprema reflejan compromisos implícitos y acuerdos negociados por actores políticos estratégicos. Por tanto, las reformas institucionales a las cortes se adoptan a fin de aminorar el conflicto político suscitado en una esfera política más amplia.

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“…Indeed, many explanations within the strategic actor or separation‐of‐powers framework point—directly or indirectly—to the importance of elected leaders' preferences to judicial decision making. Making the argument in reverse, studies have suggested that courts are less attentive to elected leaders' preferences when, for instance, the existence of a multiparty system complicates legislative repeal of their rulings (Cooter & Ginsburg 1996; Ríos‐Figueroa 2003); when parties alternate in power often (Ramseyer 1994); and in contexts with strong political competition or divided government (Chavez 2004; Scribner 2004). Helmke (2005) found that in Argentina's uncertain institutional environment, justices ruled against the sitting government more often toward the end of its tenure, in hopes of gaining favor with the incoming administration.…”

Section: The Thesis Of Tactical Balancingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision Making on Politically Crucial Cases

Kapiszewski

2011

Law Soc Rev

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This article advances a new account of judicial behavior: the thesis of tactical balancing. Building on existing models of judicial decision making, the thesis posits that high court justices balance a discrete set of considerations—justices' ideologies, their institutional interests, the potential consequences of their rulings, public opinion, elected leaders' preferences, and law—as they decide important cases. Variation in a high court's balancing of those considerations as it decides different cases leads it to alternate between challenging and endorsing the exercise of government power. The way in which high courts carry out this “tactical balancing” reflects their broader strategy for prioritizing the different roles they can play in a polity, and thus has significant implications for the rule of law and regime stability in developing democracies. The thesis is illustrated through a detailed analysis of the Brazilian high court's rulings on cases concerning crucial economic policies (1985–2004).

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Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002

Cited by 53 publications

References 0 publications

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court

Presidential Power and the Judicialization of Politics as Determinants of Institutional Change in the Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Ecuador (1979‐2009)

Tactical Balancing: High Court Decision Making on Politically Crucial Cases

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