Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons

Klein, Peter; Fumerton, Richard

doi:10.2307/2653735

Cited by 74 publications

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“…As a long standing supporter of epistemic infinitism, Peter Klein has repeatedly argued against the foundationalists' dislike of infinite chains [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. In his view there is nothing troublesome with infinite regresses, the reason being that an infinite chain of reasoning need not be completed.…”

Section: ] (Italics By the Author)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

Peijnenburg

Atkinson

2008

Stud Logica

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Section: ] (Italics By the Author)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

Peijnenburg

Atkinson

2008

Stud Logica

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“…Although I personally feel more inclined to endorse fact infinitism, perhaps we should resort to Castañeda's dia-philosophy 48 and contemplate both theories as viable tools in our effort to penetrate the nature of reality. 49 46 See Klein (1998Klein ( , 2003. 47 For a more detailed defence of fact infinitism, see Orilia (2006).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bradley’s Regress: Meinong versus Bergmann

Orilia¹

2007

Ontology and Analysis

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“…Klein (1998) and(2003). assert the existence of E 1 Fa, E 2 E 1 Fa, etc., reveals a relation of ontological dependence from Fa to E 1 Fa, from the latter to E 2 E 1 Fa, and so on ad infinitum.…”

Section: The Exernalist Regressmentioning

confidence: 98%

States of Affairs: Bradley vs. Meinong

Orilia¹

2006

Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy

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In line with much current literature, Bradley's regress is here discussed as an argument that casts doubt on the existence of states of affairs or facts, understood as complex entities working as truthmakers for true sentences or propositions. One should distinguish two versions of Bradley's regress, which stem from two different tentative explanations of the unity of states of affairs. The first version actually shows that the corresponding explanation is incoherent; the second one merely points to some prima facie implausible consequences of the explanation it stems from, e.g., that there are infinite explanatory chains and that, for any given fact, there are infinitely many facts involving exemplification relations of increasing levels. But these consequences can be swallowed after all, thereby leading to the acceptance of a doctrine which may be called fact infinitism, a doctrine adumbrated in a well-known discussion of relations by Meinong.

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Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons

Cited by 74 publications

References 0 publications

Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

Bradley’s Regress: Meinong versus Bergmann

States of Affairs: Bradley vs. Meinong

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