States of Affairs: Bradley vs. Meinong

Abstract

In line with much current literature, Bradley's regress is here discussed as an argument that casts doubt on the existence of states of affairs or facts, understood as complex entities working as truthmakers for true sentences or propositions. One should distinguish two versions of Bradley's regress, which stem from two different tentative explanations of the unity of states of affairs. The first version actually shows that the corresponding explanation is incoherent; the second one merely points to some prima facie implausible consequences of the explanation it stems from, e.g., that there are infinite explanatory chains and that, for any given fact, there are infinitely many facts involving exemplification relations of increasing levels. But these consequences can be swallowed after all, thereby leading to the acceptance of a doctrine which may be called fact infinitism, a doctrine adumbrated in a well-known discussion of relations by Meinong.

Bradley's Regress and Ungrounded Dependence Chains: A Reply to Cameron

“…We noted above the link between ontological dependence and explanation. Given this link, the objections that I have raised elsewhere (Orilia 2006(Orilia , 2007 against the attempts to show the untenability of ungrounded infinite explanatory chains provide additional support for C1. 7 Cameron plausibly views Ockham's razor as a principle that can back up the contingent but not the necessary truth of certain propositions.…”

“…involving a universal and one or more particulars, depending on whether the universal is a property or a relation). This approach is basically the ‘fact infinitism’ that I have recently defended in previous publications (Orilia 2006, 2007). 1 Its basic idea is to accept the externalist version of the regress as not merely benign, but instead as positively leading to an account of the unity of facts: the fact Fa exists (as a unity, in addition to its constituents F and a ), because another fact, namely E 2 Fa also exists (where E 2 is dyadic exemplification); in turn, E 2 Fa exists, because the fact E 3 E 2 Fa , distinct form E 2 Fa , also exists (where E 3 is triadic exemplification), and so on ad infinitum .…”

“…We noted above the link between ontological dependence and explanation. Given this link, the objections that I have raised elsewhere (Orilia 2006, 2007) against the attempts to show the untenability of ungrounded infinite explanatory chains provide additional support for C1.…”

A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella

“…It is clear that the argument applies not only to relational facts ordinarily so-called but also to monadic ones since if an individual has a property, and properties are universals, the individual is in some sense or other "related" to the property. Thus for a 3 For other similar statements of the problem see Simons (1994), Maurin (2010), Wieland and Betti (2008), Meinertsen (2008), and Orilia (2006), to name just a few. 4 Note that the sense of "internal" here is different than the customary one.…”

Positions, Ordering Relations and O-Roles

“…Option (i) gives rise to an internalist version of Bradley's regress and option (ii) to an externalist version of the regress. The former is indeed vicious, but the latter fortunately is not (Orilia , , Gaskin , section 78). By embracing it, one gets to the view that I find more congenial, which I call fact infinitism .…”