Formally Reasoning About Quality

Almagor, Shaull; Boker, Udi; Kupferman, Orna

doi:10.1145/2875421

Cited by 34 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…For LTL[F ] model checking is in PSPACE (Almagor, Boker, and Kupferman 2016), and so is model checking SLK with memoryless agents (Cermák et al 2018). We show that it is also the case for SLK[F ], as long as the functions f ∈ F can be computed in polynomial space.…”

Section: Model Checkingmentioning

confidence: 93%

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Maubert

Mittelmann

Murano

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

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Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

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Section: Model Checkingmentioning

confidence: 93%

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Maubert

Mittelmann

Murano

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

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“…[18,19]), the system requirements are formalized in a multi-valued temporal logic. These synthesis methods [19,17,18], however, do not directly solve the corresponding optimization problem, but instead check for the existence of an implementation whose value is in a given set. The optimization problem can then be reduced to a sequence of such queries.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reactive synthesis with maximum realizability of linear temporal logic specifications

2019

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A challenging problem for autonomous systems is to synthesize a reactive controller that conforms to a set of given correctness properties. Linear temporal logic (LTL) provides a formal language to specify the desired behavioral properties of systems. In applications in which the specifications originate from various aspects of the system design, or consist of a large set of formulas, the overall system specification may be unrealizable. Driven by this fact, we develop an optimization variant of synthesis from LTL formulas, where the goal is to design a controller that satisfies a set of hard specifications and minimally violates a set of soft specifications. To that end, we introduce a value function that, by exploiting the LTL semantics, quantifies the level of violation of properties. Inspired by the idea of bounded synthesis, we fix a bound on the implementation size and search for an implementation that is optimal with respect to the said value function. We propose a novel maximum satisfiability encoding of the search for an optimal implementation (within the given bound on the implementation size). We iteratively increase the bound on the implementation size until a termination criterion, such as a threshold over the value function, is met.

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“…We shall briefly mention two classes of games covered by our main theorem, but not by the results from [23,4], (bounded) energy parity games and games with the lexicographic product of meanpayoff and reachability preferences. We leave the investigation whether winning conditions defined via LTL [F] or LTL[D] formulae [1] match the criteria of Theorem 8 to future work. Another area of prospective examples to explore are multi-dimensional objectives as studied e.g.…”

Section: Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Extending finite-memory determinacy to multi-player games

Roux¹,

Pauly²

2018

Information and Computation

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We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding class of multi-player multi-outcome games. This generalizes a previous result by Brihaye, De Pril and Schewe. We provide a number of example that separate the various criteria we explore. Our proofs are generally constructive, that is, provide upper bounds for the memory required, as well as algorithms to compute the relevant Nash equilibria.

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Formally Reasoning About Quality

Cited by 34 publications

References 44 publications

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Reactive synthesis with maximum realizability of linear temporal logic specifications

Extending finite-memory determinacy to multi-player games

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